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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of family borrowing constraints in determining
human capital investments in children at early and late ages. We begin by providing new
evidence from the Children of the NLSY (CNLSY) which suggests that borrowing constraints
bind for at least some families with young children. Next, we develop an intergenerational
model of lifecycle human capital accumulation to study the role of early versus late investments
in children when credit markets are imperfect. We analytically establish the importance of
dynamic complementarity in investment for the qualitative nature of investment responses
to income and policy changes. We extend the framework to incorporate dynasties and use
data from the CNLSY to calibrate the model. Our benchmark steady state suggests that
roughly half of young parents and 12% of old parents are borrowing constrained, while older
children are unconstrained. We also identify strong complementarity between early and late
investments, suggesting that policies targeted to one stage of development tend to have similar
effects on investment in both stages. We use this calibrated model to study the effects of
education subsidies, loans and transfers offered at different ages on early and late human
capital investments and subsequent earnings in the short-run and long-run. A key lesson is
that the interaction between dynamic complementarity and early borrowing constraints means
that early interventions tend to be more successful than later interventions at improving human
capital outcomes.
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1 Introduction
By limiting the incentives and capacity to invest in human capital, financing constraints and
labor market uncertainty can play critical roles in determining aggregate productivity, national
income distributions, social mobility, and economic growth and development (Becker 1975). The
growing importance of parental income for child achievement and educational attainment (Belley
and Lochner 2007, Duncan and Murnane 2011, Reardon 2011) raises serious questions about the
ability (or willingness) of disadvantaged families to make efficient investments in their children.
In this paper, we investigate the importance of family borrowing constraints in determining
human capital investments in children at different ages. We also explore the extent to which
policies targeted to different ages can address this market failure, potentially improving economic
efficiency and equity.
Despite considerable evidence that adolescent skill levels are important in determining subse-
quent schooling and lifetime earnings (see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman 1998, Keane and Wolpin
1997, 2001, and Carneiro and Heckman 2002), only recently has the literature begun to consider
whether borrowing constraints inhibit early investments in young children (Restuccia and Urrutia
2004, Cunha 2007, Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall 2010, Lee and Seshadri 2012). This is somewhat
surprising, since studies of consumption behavior often find stronger evidence of binding liquidity
constraints for younger households (e.g. Meghir and Weber 1996, Alessie, Devereux, and Weber
1997, Stephens 2008).1 Indirect evidence suggests that constraints at early ages may play a more
important role in determining human capital investment than constraints at later ages. For ex-
ample, most empirical studies find high lifetime returns for early childhood programs, especially
for disadvantaged children (e.g., see Karoly et al. 1998, Blau and Currie 2006, or Cunha, et al.
2006, Heckman, et al. 2010). Other studies find that family income received at early childhood
ages has a greater impact on adolescent achievement when compared with income received at
later ages (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy and Duncan 1999,
Caucutt and Lochner 2006).2 More generally, a number of recent studies demonstrate that dif-
1In related work, Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou (2008) conclude that many younger and middle-age
American households are likely to be liquidity constrained based on differential car loan demand elasticities with
respect to interest rates and loan maturity. In the presence of income uncertainty, Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
empirically show that younger consumers behave as buffer-stock agents, saving small amounts (rather than borrow-
ing) due to precautionary motives, while middle-age workers save primarily for lifecycle motives. The possibility of
very low future income realizations causes young consumers to behave much like they are liquidity constrained.
2Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that early income should have a larger effect than later income due purely
to discounting (e.g. $1 at age 0 should have an effect that is (1 + r)10 larger than income at age 10, where r
is the annual interest rate). Accounting for this, they estimate similar effects of ‘early’ and ‘late’ family income
on college enrolment in the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY); however, they also
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ferences in child achievement by family income do not simply reflect unobserved differences in
families and parenting styles that are correlated with family income. These studies show that
exogenous increases in family income lead to real improvements in child development (e.g. Løken
2010, Duncan, Morris and Rodrigues 2011, Milligan and Stabile 2011, Dahl and Lochner 2012,
Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2012).
Table 1 provides new evidence from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (CNLSY) that, in the U.S., early income is a more important determinant of educational
attainment than is income earned at later ages. This table reports results from regressing ed-
ucational attainment indicators on early and late family income.3 Estimates reported in Panel
A control only for maternal education, while those in Panel B also control for other important
child and mother characteristics. Specifications described in the first four columns use total re-
ported parental earnings to measure family income, while the specifications reported in columns
5-8 use an adjusted ‘full’ earnings measure that adjusts for the possibility that some mothers
work part-time to spend more time investing in their children.4 The estimated effects are quite
similar across specifications and reveal that a $10,000 increase in discounted annual income over
ages zero to eleven significantly reduces high school dropout rates by about 2.5 percentage points,
while it increases college attendance rates by as much as 4.6 percentage points. The same increase
in discounted annual income when the child is 12-23 has smaller (and statistically insignificant)
effects on these education margins; however, the effects of early and late income are more sim-
ilar for college completion. For many specifications, differences in the effects of early and late
family income on high school completion and/or college attendance are statistically significant at
conventional levels.
Credit constraints are natural candidates to explain why some low-income families do not make
control for age 12 achievement levels which may absorb much of the effect of earlier income. Caucutt and Lochner
(2006) estimate that (discounted) income received at earlier ages has a larger impact on age 5-14 math and reading
achievement in the CNLSY than (discounted) income received at later ages.
3Income in Table 1 is measured in $10,000 year 2008 dollars, using the CPI-U to account for inflation. Income
is averaged over ages 0-11 (early income) and 12-23 (late income) after discounting income each year back to the
year the child was born using a discount rate of 5%. These assumptions and age ranges are consistent with those
used later in the calibration of our model.
4In Panel B, specifications include measures of child’s year of birth, race/ethnicity, and gender, while mother’s
characteristics include educational attainment, whether she was a teenager when the child was born, living in an
intact family at age 14, foreign-born, and Armed Forces Qualifying Test scores. The adjusted ‘full’ earnings measure
inflates earnings for mothers working less than 1,500 hours per year to its 1,500 hour equivalent (i.e. multiplies
their earnings by 1,500 and divides by reported hours). Since NLSY mothers were ages 14-22 in 1979, many of their
children are still young. Thus, our sample sizes are smaller when looking at college attendance or completion at
age 24 compared with measures of high school dropout as of age 21. We also lose some observations due to missing
mother or child characteristics (Panel B) or missing measures of hours worked (columns 5-8). See Appendix A for
additional details on the CNLSY data and our sample.
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the same investments in their children as do higher income families and why early family income
appears to be a more important determinant of educational outcomes than income received at
later ages. While (generous) government student loan programs are available for college in the
U.S. and other developed countries, neither governments nor private lenders typically offer loans to
parents to help finance human capital investments in younger children. Even though elementary
and secondary education is publicly provided, the quality of public schools available to poor
families is often low, while high quality private schools and preschool programs are typically
quite expensive. Kaushal, Magnuson, and Waldfogel (2011) find that families in the bottom
family expenditure quintile spend 3% of their total expenditures on educational enrichment items,
while families in the top quintile spend 9%. Parental spending on education-related items and
activities rises with total family expenditures. Parental time is also an important input for a
young child’s development that poor parents may be unable to afford.5 Finally, most parents of
young children are young themselves, in the early stages of their labor market careers and without
a solid credit history. Even young college-educated parents may be constrained by mortgages,
their own schooling loans, and other liabilities. While we do not know exactly how any given
parents might spend additional resources, recent studies clearly show that those resources lead
to improvements in child outcomes (Løken 2010, Duncan, Morris and Rodrigues 2011, Milligan
and Stabile 2011, Dahl and Lochner 2012, Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2012).
Investment in human capital is a multi-stage process that begins early in life.6 As a re-
sult, human capital investment is an intergenerational family problem.7 We develop a human
capital-based theory of the family that incorporates the dynamic nature of investment in chil-
dren, intergenerational transfers, and borrowing constraints faced by parents and college-age
youth. Our theory accounts for the fact that later investments build on earlier investments, that
early childhood investments are made by young parents at the beginning of their careers, and
that desired borrowing may differ substantially over the lifecycle.
In our framework, young parents make early investments in their children and provide them
with consumption. These parents also make their own consumption choices and borrow or save
to intertemporally allocate resources. Constraints on their borrowing may limit consumption
5See Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2010). Using data from American Time Use Surveys, Guryan, Hurst and
Kearney (2008) establish a robust positive education gradient in childcare. Higher-educated parents spend more
time in childcare than less educated parents, whether or not one controls for employment status.
6See, e.g., Becker (1975), Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007), Cunha, et al. (2006), Cunha (2007), Cunha and
Heckman (2007), Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010), Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2010), and Lee and
Seshadri (2012).
7See, e.g., Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), Loury (1981), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Galor and Ziera (1993),
Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004).
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and investments in young children. Once children become young adults, they make additional
investments in themselves (e.g. college), using their own earnings, transfers from their parents,
and student loans to cover schooling costs and consumption. Again, choices may be constrained
by imperfect credit markets. Older parents must decide how much to transfer to their college-age
children and how much to borrow or save for their own current and future consumption. Once a
child leaves the home to establish his own family, parents continue to work, save, and consume
until retirement. This cycle repeats itself, as young adults grow into parenthood.
The dynamic nature of human capital investment has important implications for the role of
borrowing constraints and economic policies. Consistent with the analysis of Cunha and Heckman
(2007), we show that dynamic complementarity in investment – the complementarity between
early and late investments in human capital – plays a central role in determining the impacts of
family income, investment subsidies and borrowing constraints on investment over the lifecycle.
When investments are sufficiently complementary, a policy that encourages investment at one
stage of development will also tend to increase investment at other stages. By contrast, when
investments are substitutable over time, a subsidy or loan increase at one stage of development
tends to shift investment to that stage and away from others. Indirect evidence discussed in
Cunha, et al. (2006) and estimates by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) suggest that
investments are quite complementary. Calibration of our intergenerational model produces a
similarly strong degree of dynamic complementarity.8
A large literature considers the impacts of college-age policies on schooling and labor mar-
ket outcomes holding early investment and adolescent achievement levels fixed (e.g. Cameron and
Heckman 1998, Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998, Keane and Wolpin 2001, Caucutt and Kumar
2003, Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz 2003, Johnson 2010, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante 2011).9
The degree of dynamic complementarity we calibrate suggests that these policies not only affect
college-going, but they also have significant impacts on earlier investments in children. Our quan-
titative analysis suggests that ignoring these earlier investment responses may lead researchers to
under-estimate the total wage impact of college-age investment subsidies by as much as 60%.
The timing of borrowing constraints is also important and interacts with dynamic complemen-
tarity in investment. As discussed above, early income appears to be more important than later
8Unlike Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010), we do not distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. To the extent that these skills are combined to create a composite productivity (i.e. human capital) level
used in the labor market, we effectively identify the technology mapping early and late investments (in cognitive
or non-cognitive skills) into this productivity measure.
9Traditional difference-in-difference or reduced form studies of the impact of tuition or aid levels on college-going
also implicitly hold early investment behaviors fixed.
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income for educational attainment. Based on this feature of the CNLSY data, our calibration
finds that borrowing constraints are more severe for young families with young children. Increas-
ing borrowing opportunities or subsidizing investment for families with young children would lead
to important (short-run) increases in human capital investments at early and college-going ages.
By comparison, increasing borrowing limits for college students and older parents has very small
effects. The latter is consistent with the findings of Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010).
When compared with subsidies for early investments, subsidies for college also have weaker effects
on human capital investment, since they come too late for many constrained families. Due to
early borrowing constraints, many families cannot increase early investments to fully take ad-
vantage of later subsidies. Given strong complementarity of investments over time, additional
later investments may not be worthwhile for these families. Thus, dynamic complementarity and
early borrowing constraints interact in a way that limits the effectiveness of college-age policies
for disadvantaged families.
While the impact of a policy depends on its timing, whether it is an in-kind transfer or
subsidy is also important for understanding which groups benefit most. Our analysis suggests
that increasing the amount of public spending on early investments disproportionately increases
early investment for children whose parents are at the bottom of the education distribution. By
contrast, increasing the subsidy to early investment disproportionately increases investment for
those whose parents are at the top of the education distribution.
The intergenerational nature of human capital investment is also important. Keane and
Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010) both emphasize the importance of differences in parental
transfers by socioeconomic background in explaining differential schooling outcomes; however,
parental transfers are exogenously determined and unaffected by policy and economic conditions
in their models. By endogenizing parental transfers, we account for the fact that parents respond
to different policies by adjusting transfers to their children. Furthermore, our dynastic approach
to human capital investment enables us to study dynamic effects of lasting economic policies that
are typically ignored by much of the literature.
First, we differentiate between the short-run effects of one-time, single-generation policies
targeted to parents and similar policies that are put in place permanently. (Most empirical micro
studies consider the former, while quantitative macro studies typically focus on the latter.) One-
time policies indirectly affect children only through parental transfers, while permanent policy
changes also affect children directly once those children grow up. Because these channels can
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have opposing or reinforcing effects on investment depending on the type of intervention, the
short-term effects of new policies depend heavily on how long they are expected to remain in
place.
Second, our dynastic approach enables us to simulate the long-run effects of permanent policy
changes in addition to the short-run effects typically measured in empirical studies. While short-
run effects are based on the current distributions of wealth and human capital in the population,
long-run effects take into account changes in these distributions over time. This is quite important
when considering a policy to increase borrowing opportunities for young parents. In the short-
run, such a policy has the expected effects of increasing borrowing and human capital investment.
In the long-run, increases in borrowing cause parents to accumulate more debt and transfer less
resources to their children. Over time, this leads to higher debt levels, pushing families nearly
as close to borrowing limits as initial generations were before the policy change. While early
generations accumulate more human capital, later generations do not. By contrast, investment
subsidies appear to have greater long-run impacts (relative to short-run impacts), because they
encourage human capital investment without building debt levels.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop a lifecycle model of human capital
investment with borrowing constraints. Allowing for two periods of investment, we analytically
study the effects of changes in income in both periods. The results are useful in interpreting the
empirical evidence in Table 1 on the relative importance of early vs. late income for educational
attainment. We show that our findings are broadly consistent with strong dynamic comple-
mentarity in investments and binding borrowing constraints for many young families. We also
analytically investigate the effect of relaxing borrowing constraints at different ages on investment
behavior. This analysis establishes the importance of dynamic complementarity for the qualita-
tive nature of investment responses. We demonstrate equivalence between the lifecycle model
and an intergenerational problem where parents decide on their own consumption and transfer
resources to their children to invest and consume. This highlights that endogenizing parental
transfers does not alter the qualitative properties of the lifecycle problem.
In Section 3, we expand the model to a fully dynastic overlapping-generations framework in
which altruistic parents value the utility of their children. We calibrate this model in Section 4
using data from the CNLSY on family income at different stages of child development, educational
attainment by children and their parents, and the earnings outcomes of children. This analysis
assumes a CES human capital production function without imposing any assumptions on the
7
complementarity of investments across different stages of development. It allows for unobserved
heterogeneity in ability and post-school shocks to labor market earnings.
Based on our calibrated model, in Section 5 we simulate the impacts of various policy changes
including increases in borrowing limits, investment subsidies, and income transfers. We discuss
both short- and long-run effects of policies. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The Economics of Early and Late Human Capital Investments
and Borrowing Constraints
In this section, we study ‘early’ and ‘late’ investments in human capital and the roles of borrowing
constraints and family resources at different stages of development. The analysis highlights the
importance of dynamic complementarity in investments for determining the impacts of both
borrowing constraints and family resources on investment decisions. Our analysis begins with
a multi-period lifecycle model to focus on intertemporal tradeoffs central to the links between
the timing of borrowing constraints, family resources, and human capital investments. We then
show that this analysis extends to a multi-period intergenerational framework, in which parents
decide on their own consumption and transfer resources to their children for investment and
consumption. By mapping a two-generation problem directly into our initial lifecycle problem,
we show that all of our ‘lifecycle’ results extend naturally to a two-generation framework.
2.1 Lifecycle Model with Early and Late Investments
We assume that people live through six periods in their lives. Human capital investment takes
place in the first two periods (i.e. ‘childhood’), followed by three periods of work and a period of
retirement. We are agnostic about the form of investments, instead focusing on the intertemporal
nature of skill production and investment choices. Conceptually, investments may include various
forms of goods inputs like computers and books, parental time in child development activities,
formal schooling, and other time inputs by older children. Our main focus in this section is on
the importance of multiple investment periods during childhood.
2.1.1 Technology for Human Capital Production
Denote an individual’s ability to learn by θ. (Below, this could also reflect ‘parenting ability’.)
Investments in periods 1 and 2 are given by i1 and i2, respectively. Together, these investments
produce period 3 human capital:
h3 = f(i1, i2, θ). (1)
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The human capital production function f(·) is strictly increasing in all of its arguments and strictly
concave in both investment arguments. We further assume that f13 and f23 are non-negative, so
that ability and investments are complements. To guarantee appropriate second order conditions
hold in the decision problems described below, we assume the following throughout our analysis:
Assumption 1. f12 > max
{
f22
(
f1
f2
)
, f11
(
f2
f1
)}
and f212 < f11f22.
Most reasonable specifications for human capital production would have f12 ≥ 0, satisfying the
first part of this assumption. The second part limits the degree of complementarity in investments.
In our computational analysis below, we employ a CES human capital production function of
the form
f(i1, i2, θ) = θ(aib1 + (1− a)ib2)d/b, (2)
where a ∈ (0, 1), b < 1, and d ∈ (0, 1); however, our theoretical analysis does not rely on
any particular functional form. Assumption 1 holds for this production function. We impose
decreasing returns to scale (i.e. d < 1); otherwise unconstrained individuals may want to invest
an infinite amount.
Adult earnings depend on human capital acquired through childhood investments. Given our
emphasis on childhood human capital investment (i.e. early childhood and schooling investments),
we assume that human capital grows exogenously after childhood:
h4 = Γ4h3 and h5 = Γ5h4. (3)
Adult earnings are given by
W (hj) = whj , for j ∈ {3, 4, 5}, (4)
where w > 0 reflects the wage per unit of skill.
2.1.2 Lifecycle Decision Problem
We assume standard time separable preferences for consumption,
6∑
j=1
βj−1u(cj), where the time
discount rate β ∈ (0, 1) and utility function u(c) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfies
standard Inada conditions. Individuals receive exogenous financial transfers yj during childhood
periods j = 1, 2, which could reflect transfers from parents or the government. They may also
reflect earnings while in school for older children. Below, we explicitly endogenize transfers to
children (from parents) in an intergenerational framework.
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The gross rate of return on borrowing and saving is R > 0. Assets saved in period j are given
by aj+1, and total borrowing (negative aj+1) may be limited by a restriction on debt carried over
to the next period, −Lj . During retirement, individuals consume their savings and do not work.
For some of our analysis, it is convenient to separate the lifecycle decision problem into
investment and post-investment periods. Consider individuals entering adulthood (period 3)
with human capital h3 and assets a3. They allocate consumption across their remaining life
subject to any constraints:
V3(a3, h3) = max
c3,c4,c5,c6
6∑
j=3
βj−3u(cj)
subject to budget constraints aj+1 = Raj + W (hj) − cj for j = 3, 4, 5; borrowing constraints
a4 ≥ −L3 and a5 ≥ −L4; and c6 = Ra6.
Children allocate their resources to consumption and investment, leaving some assets/debt
for adulthood:
max
c1,c2,i1,i2,a3
u(c1) + βu(c2) + β2V3(a3, f(i1, i2, θ)) (5)
subject to budget constraints:
aj+1 = Raj + yj − ij − cj for j = 1, 2;
and borrowing constraints:
a2 ≥ −L1 and a3 ≥ −L2.
2.1.3 Lifecycle Investment Behavior
Consumption allocations satisfy u′(cj) ≥ βRu′(cj+1), ∀j = 1, ..., 5, where the inequality is strict
if and only if the borrowing constraint for that period (Lj) binds. First order conditions for
investment imply:
u′(c1) = β2
∂V3(a3, h3)
∂h3
f1(i1, i2, θ), (6)
u′(c2) = β
∂V3(a3, h3)
∂h3
f2(i1, i2, θ), (7)
where ∂V3(a3,h3)∂h3 = w
[
u′(c3) + βΓ4u′(c4) + β2Γ4Γ5u′(c5)
]
> 0. Taking the ratio of these equations
reveals that optimal investment equates the technical rate of substitution in the production of
human capital with the marginal rate of substitution for consumption: f1(i1,i2,θ)f2(i1,i2,θ) =
u′(c1)
βu′(c2) ≥ R.
Unconstrained optimal investments for an individual of ability θ, iu1(θ) and i
u
2(θ), satisfy
f1(iu1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R2
χ and f2(i
u
1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R
χ , where χ = w(1+R
−1Γ4+R−2Γ4Γ5) reflects the
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discounted present value of an additional unit of human capital. Thus, unconstrained investments
maximize the discounted present value of earnings net of discounted investment costs. They are
independent of the marginal utility of consumption and income/transfers, since individuals can
optimally smooth consumption across periods. This is not true when borrowing constraints bind.
Proposition 1. Let i∗1 and i∗2 reflect optimal first and second period investment. Then, (i)
f1(i∗1, i∗2, θ) > f1(iu1 , iu2 , θ) =
R2
χ if and only if any borrowing constraint binds; (ii) f2(i
∗
1, i
∗
2, θ) >
f2(iu1 , i
u
2 , θ) =
R
χ if and only if borrowing limits L2, L3 or L4 bind; (iii) there is under-investment
in at least one period and possibly both (i.e. i∗1 < iu1 and/or i∗2 < iu2) if and only if any borrowing
constraint binds.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Facing a binding constraint at any point, even later in life, implies under-investment in human
capital during at least one period. When the first period borrowing constraint binds, f1/f2 > R
and there is too little early investment relative to late investment. When only the second period
(or later constraints) bind, both early and late investments tend to be too low even though
f1/f2 = R. We next explore how investments in both periods depend on borrowing limits and
financial transfers.
To focus on the role of borrowing constraints during investment periods, much of the remaining
analysis is simplified considerably if we assume that credit constraints are non-binding in later
periods after investments have been made. We state this assumption formally here and refer to
it explicitly when used.
Assumption 2. Unconstrained adulthood: V3(a, h) = v3(Ra+ χh) where
vτ (z) = max
cτ ,...,c6
6∑
j=τ
βj−τu(cj) subject to
6∑
j=τ
Rτ−jcj = z. (8)
Notice vτ (z) reflects the maximized discounted lifetime utility for an unconstrained adult
with total resources z as of period τ . It is strictly increasing and strictly concave in z given our
assumptions on u(·). For an unconstrained adult in period 3, the total value of lifetime wealth is
given by Ra3+χh3, reflecting the value of current assets plus the discounted flow of labor income.
The complementarity of investments across periods plays a central role in determining indi-
vidual responses to borrowing constraints. In particular, the following dynamic complementarity
condition is important for a number of results:
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Condition 1. f12f1f2 > −
v′′3 (−RL2+χh3)
v′3(−RL2+χh3)χ.
This condition simplifies nicely with the CES production function given in equation (2) and
utility function u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ . In this case, Condition 1 cannot hold if d ≤ b, but this only rules out
very strong substitution between early and late investments, since d > 0.10 For the more relevant
case of d > b, Condition 1 simplifies to
1
1− b︸ ︷︷ ︸
elast. of sub.
<
1
σ︸︷︷︸
CIES
·
(
1− RL2
χh3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1- maximum debtlifetime income
·
(
d− b
d(1− b)
)
.
As the elasticity of substitution between early and late investments decreases (i.e. investments
become more complementary) or the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES)
increases (i.e. individuals become less concerned about maintaining smooth consumption profiles),
this inequality is more likely to hold. For b ≤ 0 (complementarity at least as strong as implied
by a Cobb-Douglas production function) and L2 = 0, this condition is satisfied whenever the
elasticity of substitution between early and late investments is less than the CIES. More generally,
when individual preferences for smooth consumption are strong, Condition 1 requires strong
complementarity between early and late investments.
We now discuss how income transfers during early and late childhood affect investment de-
cisions over both stages of development. In our two-generation model of Section 2.2, we show
that these results also apply to parental income over the first two periods of a child’s life. They
are, therefore, helpful in interpreting evidence on the impact of family income on educational at-
tainment (i.e. late investments i2) found in Table 1. As noted above, changes in transfers y1 and
y2 have no effect on investments for unconstrained individuals. The following proposition shows
how constraints at different stages of development determine the responsiveness of investment to
changes in financial transfers.
Proposition 2. Assume no borrowing constraints during adulthood (Assumption 2).
I. If borrowing constraints only bind in late childhood, then
(i) ∂i1∂y1 = R
∂i1
∂y2
= ∂i1
∂(R−1y2) > 0;
(ii) ∂i2∂y1 = R
∂i2
∂y2
= ∂i2
∂(R−1y2) > 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 = R
∂h3
∂y2
= ∂h3
∂(R−1y2) > 0.
II. If borrowing constraints only bind in early childhood, then
(i) ∂i1∂y1 > 0; and
∂i1
∂y2
< 0;
10When d ≤ b, f12 ≤ 0.
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(ii) ∂i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0; and ∂i2∂y2 < 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 > 0; and
∂h3
∂y2
< 0.
III. If borrowing constraints bind during both early and late childhood, then
(i) ∂i1∂y1 > 0; and
∂i1
∂y2
> 0 ⇐⇒ Condition 1 holds;
(ii) ∂i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ Condition 1 holds; and ∂i2∂y2 > 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 > 0 and
∂h3
∂y2
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
We highlight two key implications of this proposition and relate them to the estimates in
Table 1. First, note that if early borrowing constraints are non-binding, investments depend only
on the discounted present value of financial transfers y1 + R−1y2, not the timing of transfers
(conditional on discounting y2). When no constraints bind, investments are independent of all
transfers, while investments depend positively on the discounted present value of transfers when
only the late constraint binds. Second, when the early constraint binds, both the timing of income
and the extent of dynamic complementarity are important factors determining the response of
investments to changes in transfers. For example, early investments are always increasing in
y1; however, they are decreasing in y2 if only the early constraint binds since a late transfer
exacerbates this constraint. When only the early constraint binds, the impacts of transfers on late
investment depend entirely on their effects on early investments and whether early investments
raise or lower the marginal return to late investments. When constraints are binding throughout
childhood, transfers in any period increase investments in both periods if and only if there is
sufficient dynamic complementarity.
Table 1 shows that educational attainment – late investment in the context of our model – is
significantly increasing in early income and unaffected by or marginally increasing in late income.
Based on Proposition 2, the asymmetry in effects of early vs. (discounted) late income implies that
early borrowing constraints are binding. The fact that late investments are increasing in early
income suggests that early and late investments must be sufficiently complementary. Altogether,
the results in Table 1 are most consistent with binding early and late constraints and substantial
dynamic complementarity (case III of Proposition 2).11
11Introducing uncertainty in y2 does not alter investment behavior in the absence of borrowing constraints. If
late borrowing constraints may bind for some realizations of y2, i2 will be increasing in y2 for those realizations.
With sufficient complementarity, this also tends to cause i2 to increase with y1. If only early borrowing constraints
bind, then i2 will be increasing in y1 if and only if f12 > 0. To the extent that y2 is completely unpredictable, it
will have no effects on i1 or i2 in this case. More generally, when only early borrowing constraints bind and y2 is
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We next analyze the effects of borrowing constraints on human capital investments. First,
consider relaxing constraints on older children.
Proposition 3. Assume that borrowing constraints bind during late childhood (i.e. a3 = −L2)
but that there are no future borrowing constraints (Assumption 2).
(i) If the early borrowing constraint does not bind (i.e. a2 > −L1), then: ∂i1∂L2 > 0, ∂i2∂L2 ∈ (0, 1),
and ∂h3∂L2 > 0.
(ii) If the early borrowing constraint also binds (i.e. a2 = −L1), then: ∂i1∂L2 > 0 if Condition 1
holds; ∂i2∂L2 ∈ (0, 1); and ∂h3∂L2 > 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Relaxing borrowing constraints during late childhood unambiguously increases late invest-
ments. If early constraints are non-binding or if early and late investments are sufficiently
complementary, then any increase in late investments encourages additional early investments
as well. Even in the case of strong intertemporal substitutability when early investments may
decline, individuals acquire more human capital h3 when the late constraint is relaxed.
Next, consider relaxing the constraint on young children.
Proposition 4. Assume that borrowing constraints bind during early childhood (i.e. a2 = −L1),
but there are no borrowing constraints during adulthood (Assumption 2).
(i) If the late borrowing constraint does not bind, then ∂i1∂L1 ∈ (0, 1); ∂i2∂L1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0;
and ∂h3∂L1 > 0.
(ii) If the late borrowing constraint also binds (i.e. a3 = −L2) and Condition 1 does not hold,
then ∂i1∂L1 > 0 and
∂i2
∂L1
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
When individuals are only constrained during early childhood, relaxing that constraint leads
to an increase in early investment, which encourages late investment as long as the marginal
productivity of i2 is increasing in i1.
When children are constrained in both periods, relaxing the early constraint effectively shifts
resources from late to early childhood. If early and late investments are very complementary,
partially unknown at the time early investments are made, late investments should be increasing in y1 (assuming
f12 > 0) and only weakly but positively related to y2. Unobserved heterogeneity in ability θ can also lead to a
positive correlation between i2 and both early and late income if ability is related to parental income; however,
there is little reason to think that ability should be more correlated with early income than late income.
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they will both tend to move in the same direction. In most cases, investments will increase;
however, it is possible that investments could actually decrease in both periods. Intuitively, if
late investments are very productive, then relaxing the early borrowing constraint can ‘starve’
those investments. By contrast, if investments are sufficiently substitutable over time, shifting
resources from late to early childhood by relaxing the early constraint causes investment to shift
from the late to the early period as well.
Finally, we show how policies targeted to adult ages can affect investments at earlier ages
due to the forward-looking nature of investment decisions. These results are important in our
intergenerational framework when we consider the consequences of permanent policy changes that
affect the resources or constraints faced by young parents. These policies have two distinct effects
on child investment behavior in equilibrium. First, they affect young children via their impact on
parental transfers. Second, forward-looking children adjust their investment behavior in response
to changes in future opportunities when they become adults.
Transfers and loans for constrained young adults affect the marginal returns to early and
late investment. As seen in equations (6) and (7), these marginal returns are increasing in the
marginal utility of consumption at adult ages and decreasing in consumption levels. Consider
a financial transfer y3 to adults in period 3 that are borrowing constrained in that period and
all earlier periods. By increasing adult consumption, this income transfer reduces the marginal
return on investments (both early and late) and unambiguously lowers investment. An equivalent
increase in borrowing opportunities L3 also raises period 3 consumption but lowers subsequent
consumption as the loan is repaid. Thus, the effects on investment are weaker (or even positive).
These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume that borrowing constraints bind throughout childhood (i.e. a2 = −L1 and
a3 = −L2) and in period 3 (i.e. a4 = −L3), but there are no borrowing constraints after period 3.
Let y3 reflect an income transfer received in period 3. Then,
∂ij
∂y3
< 0 and ∂ij∂L3 >
∂ij
∂y3
for j = 1, 2.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Suppose that an individual is constrained throughout childhood and investments are suf-
ficiently complementary. Proposition 2 implies that individuals increase both early and late
investments if they receive a transfer while investing in their human capital. We refer to this as
the “current effect” of a transfer. If instead, the individual expects to receive a transfer while
earning the returns on his investments, Proposition 5 implies that he will respond by reducing
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investments. We refer to this effect as the “future effect” of a transfer. A similar dichotomy can be
applied to other policies (e.g. increased borrowing opportunities for young adults). Considered to-
gether, the “current” and “future” effects of policy highlight the importance of quantitative work
in an intergenerational context when children are affected both directly and indirectly by policies
targeted at adults. Children are directly impacted, since they will become adults themselves one
day. They are also indirectly impacted through changes in parental transfers. Since the “current”
and “future” effects can push investment in opposite directions, it is unclear ex ante, whether
income transfers or expansions in lending opportunities will encourage or discourage investment
when the policies are operative over the entire lifecycle.
2.2 A Two-Generation Problem
We now extend the analysis to a two-generation family decision problem in which parents choose
their own consumption and how much to transfer to their children for their investment and
consumption. As we show, this problem can conveniently be mapped into the lifecycle problem
described above.
Assume that both parents and children live for six periods, working in periods 3-5. Given our
focus on investments in children, we concentrate on periods when children are alive, beginning
with period 3 for parents. Young children are assumed to have no assets of their own and
cannot borrow or save, while older children can borrow/save. Parents transfer resources during
both investment periods of the child (i.e. periods 1 and 2 of the child, periods 3 and 4 of the
parents). Borrowing constraints may limit intertemporal allocations as above. We abstract from
complicated dynamic strategic interactions between parents and children by assuming no further
interactions between parents and children following the investment periods.12
Parents are altruistic towards their children, valuing utility from their own consumption as well
as the utility of their children. We use prime superscripts to denote variables for the child, while
subscripts continue to refer to age/period. For parents with incomes (Y3, Y4, Y5) and ‘altruism’
parameter ρ > 0, the family decision problem (beginning at period 1 of child, 3 of parent) can be
12Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2012) show that with multiple periods of intergenerational transfers and the
inability of parents to commit to future transfers, children have an incentive to under-invest early on in order to
extract more resources from parents at later ages. These problems disappear with full commitment or the capacity
for parents to effectively choose investment levels for their children (e.g. through tied transfers). Our problem is
equivalent to both of these cases.
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written as follows:13
max
c′1,c
′
2,c3,c4,c5,c6,a
′
3,i
′
1,i
′
2

6∑
j=3
βj−3u(cj) + ρ
[
u(c′1) + βu(c
′
2) + β
2V3(a′3, f(i
′
1, i
′
2, θ
′))
]
subject to
c′1 + c3 = Y3 − a4 − i′1
c′2 + c4 = Ra4 + Y4 − (a′3 + a5)− i′2
c5 = Ra5 + Y5 − a6
a4 ≥ −L3
a5 ≥ −L4
a′3 ≥ −L2
and c6 = Ra6. The child’s continuation value V3(a′3, h′3) is defined earlier in Section 2.1.2, and
parental transfers are given by yj = i′j + c
′
j for j = 1, 2.
2.2.1 A Two-Stage Solution to the Intergenerational Problem
If we assume that (i) children are unconstrained after their investment periods (Assumption 2)
and (ii) borrowing when the child is old is only restricted by a single family borrowing constraint
A3 ≡ a′3+a5 ≥ −(L2+L4), then it is possible to write this family problem as a two-stage problem.
Investment and total family resources over time are determined in the first stage (analogous to
the lifecycle problem in Section 2.1), while individual consumption allocations are determined
in the second stage. By considering a single borrowing constraint for families with old children
(rather than separate constraints for the old child and his parent), we focus attention on cases
when both old children and their parents are constrained or both are unconstrained.14
Defining the functions
W (C) = max
z
{v5(C − z) + ρv3(z)} (9)
and
U(C) = max
x
{u(C − x) + ρu(x)} , (10)
13Note that Y3 may reflect parental income in period 3 and the value of any assets/debts they carry into that
period.
14Whether or not the borrowing constraint for the parents of old children binds is irrelevant for investment. If
only this constraint binds, then investments will be at the unconstrained optimal levels and will be independent of
parental income. When the constraint on old children binds, the problem is very similar to the case described in
this section where constraints bind for both old children and their parents. Results for i1 and i2 are qualitatively
the same, except that changes in L4 would have no effect since it is non-binding.
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the family problem can be solved in two stages.15
Stage 1 : Determine intertemporal total family resource allocations (C1, C2, C3) and invest-
ments (i′1, i′2):
max
C1,C2,C3,i′1,i
′
2
{
U(C1) + βU(C2) + β2W (C3)
}
subject to
C1 = Y3 − a4 − i′1
C2 = Ra4 + Y4 −A3 − i′2
C3 = RA3 + Y5 + χf(i′1, i
′
2, θ
′)
a4 ≥ −L3
A3 ≥ −(L2 + L4).
Stage 2 : (a) Determine the optimal allocation of total family consumption (C1, C2) to the
child (c′1, c′2) and parent (c3, c4) for both investment periods based on equation (10). (b) Allocate
post-investment period assets to children (a′3) and parents (a5) by solving equation (9). (c)
Solve for child consumption allocations (c′3, c′4, c′5, c′6) given (i′1, i′2, a′3) and parental consumption
allocations (c′5, c′6) given a5 by solving equation (8).
2.2.2 Investment Behavior and Endogenous Parental Transfers
We focus on the Stage 1 problem, since it determines investments. This problem is the same as
the lifecycle problem of Section 2.1, replacing child consumption, transfers and assets with family
consumption, income and assets, u(·) with U(·), and v3(·) with W (·).16 As such, investments
i′1 and i′2 have the same qualitative properties here as in the lifecycle problem (with a slight
modification to Condition 1).17 Propositions 2-4 can be applied to an intergenerational context
with comparative statics results for L1 applying to changes in L3 here, results for L2 applying
equally to changes in L2 or L4 here (as long as both old children and their parents are constrained),
and results for y1 and y2 applying to changes in Y3 and Y4, respectively.18
15The functions v5(·) and v3(·) are defined by equation (8).
16Since u(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, the functions vj(·), U(·), and W (·) are also strictly
increasing and strictly concave.
17Condition 1 must be slightly modified to Condition 1′: f12
f1f2
> −W ′′(−R(L2+L4)+Y5+χh′3)
W ′(−R(L2+L4)+Y5+χh′3)
χ. In the special case
with u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ and CES human capital production function given by equation (2), Condition 1
′ simplifies to
1
1−b <
1
σ
(
1− R(L2+L4)
χh′3
+ Y5
χh′3
)(
d−b
d(1−b)
)
if d > b. For Y5 ≥ 0, if Condition 1 is satisfied, then Condition 1′ is
satisfied.
18Results analogous to Propositions 1 and 5 also apply; however, they require slightly more involved (and tedious)
analyses.
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Altogether, the results of Section 2.1 generalize naturally to an intergenerational context
with respect to changes in borrowing limits or total family resources at different stages of the
child’s life. Proposition 2 shows that the timing of parental income and the extent of dynamic
complementarity are important for investments in children when young parents are borrowing
constrained. Furthermore, sufficient dynamic complementarity implies that both early and late
investments tend to increase when constraints on parents or children are relaxed during either
investment period (Propositions 3 and 4).
Propositions 2-4 are also useful for understanding how parental transfers respond to changes
in borrowing limits or parental income. Without constraints on parental transfers, the consump-
tion of parents and children positively co-move within any given period in response to policy or
income changes. Increasing the income or borrowing limits for constrained old parents leads to
contemporaneous increases in the parent’s and child’s consumption, as well as late investments
and parental transfers. With sufficient dynamic complementarity in investments or if early family
borrowing constraints are non-binding (i.e. a4 > −L3), parents will also increase early transfers
and investments. By contrast, when early constraints are binding and investments are sufficiently
substitutable over time, parents may respond to an (anticipated) increase in L4 or Y4 by trans-
ferring less to and investing less in their children when they are young. When increasing the
borrowing limits or incomes of constrained young parents, transfers to young children increase as
long as early investments increase (see Proposition 4); however, parents may reduce investments
in and transfers to children at older ages if investments are quite substitutable. Altogether, we
should generally expect transfers to co-move with investments in response to changes in parental
resources. By contrast, a policy that relaxes borrowing constraints on older children, L2, would
increase late investments i2 but lead to a reduction in parental transfers as children and parents
alike benefit from the additional resources. Parental transfers adjust to spread the gains (or
losses) of a policy change throughout the family.
In the next section, we consider the fact that families may not always be able to freely spread
resources across generations. In particular, parental transfers may be constrained to be non-
negative if parents cannot easily extract resources from their children. This limits the ability of
some families to spread the gains from policies directed at children (and future generations) to
parents.
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Diagram 1: Generations of a Dynasty
· · · − − −−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Post−Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retirement
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Post−Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retirement
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Parent
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Parent
· · ·
− − −−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y oung Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Child
· · ·
3 A Dynastic Framework
To understand the long-run effects of policy, we need to consider the evolution of assets and
human capital over time. This requires an intergenerational dynastic framework. Assuming that
children become parents themselves, valuing their own children’s utility, and that those children
have children of their own, the problem becomes dynastic. Parents transfer resources to their
children, who grow up, become parents of their own children, and transfer resources to them
in an analogous fashion. In a dynastic framework, permanent policy changes not only affect
human capital investments via their impact on opportunities today but also through their effect
on opportunities in the future. As demonstrated in the previous section, current and future effects
of new loans or transfers can move investment in opposite directions, requiring quantitative work
to determine the sign of the total impact of a permanent policy.
As above, we assume that people live through six periods in their life. We refer to these periods
as young and old childhood, young and old parenthood, post-parenthood, and retirement. The
lifecycle of different generations in a dynasty is given by Diagram 1.
We assume that young children cannot borrow or save themselves (i.e. a2 = 0), and that
young parents make investment and consumption decisions for their young children. Although old
children make investment decisions, we assume that it is their last period of financial interaction
with their parents, so there is no scope for strategic behavior. It is, therefore possible to write
the entire family problem from the point of view of parents. We assume that the ability of a
child depends on that of the parent following a simple Markov process. Once a child is born, the
parent’s ability becomes irrelevant. However, the child’s ability affects parental decisions, because
it impacts the child’s ability to accumulate human capital, and it plays a role in determining the
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future ability of the grandchild.
To make the problem more realistic and suitable for quantitative analysis, we extend the family
problem in three important ways: We introduce earnings shocks, allow borrowing constraints to
depend on human capital levels, and incorporate public spending on education and investment
subsidies. We also constrain families so that parents must make non-negative transfers to their
children. Due to the nature of assumed earnings shocks, it is useful to allow for human capital-
specific growth rates, Γ4(h3) and Γ5(h4), as discussed further below.
To account for variation in earnings within education classes, we introduce period j-specific
earnings shocks ²j for young and old parents, so
W (hj , ²j) = whj + ²j , for j = 3, 4, (11)
W (h5) = wh5. (12)
These shocks are distributed such that earnings are always non-negative. To simplify computa-
tion, we abstract from shocks in period 5, when parents and children are no longer economically
linked.
We allow borrowing constraints to depend on the future human capital of an individual to
account for the possibility that higher education increases borrowing opportunities. This is both
theoretically and empirically attractive for reasons discussed in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2011).19 We assume that borrowing limits depend on the lowest possible discounted value of
future earnings, since that determines the amount a person can credibly commit to re-pay under
any circumstances (Ayagari 1994). Letting ²j = min{²j} represent the lowest possible earnings
shock in period j, we assume the following limits on borrowing:
L2(h3) = γ[R−1(wh3 + ²3) +R
−2(wΓ4(h3)h3 + ²4) +R
−3wΓ4(h3)Γ5(h3 + Γ4(h3))h3],
L3(h3) = γ[R−1(Γ4(h3)h3 + ²4) +R
−2wΓ4(h3)Γ5(h3 + Γ4(h3))h3],
L4(h3) = γR−1wΓ4(h3)Γ5(h3 + Γ4(h3))h3,
where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, the parameter γ reflects the efficiency of credit markets, since γ near
zero implies that no borrowing is allowed while γ near one implies that individuals can borrow
fully against guaranteed future earnings.20
19Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) argue that more skilled individuals can commit to re-pay higher debts,
explaining why private lenders offer them more credit. Furthermore, the federal student loan system explicitly links
loan amounts to post-secondary enrollment and the level of schooling attended.
20Of course, γ could vary across stages of the lifecycle; however, we do not expect to be able to separately
calibrate three different γ values given our data.
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We incorporate freely provided public investment in each period of childhood, denoting these
public investments p1 and p2. Thus, total investment in period j is given by pj + ij . We further
assume that private spending on investment in each period is subsidized at rates s1 and s2.
Below, we consider the effects of policies that adjust these publicly provided investment levels
and subsidy rates.
Letting prime superscripts denote the child’s variables, the problem facing a young parent
with a young child is given by:
V3(h3, ²3, a3, θ′) = max
c3,a4,c′1,i
′
1
{
u(c3) + ρu(c′1) + βE²4V4(h4, ²4, a4, h
′
2, θ
′)
}
subject to
a4 = Ra3 +W (h3, ²3)− c3 − i′1(1− s1)− c′1,
a4 ≥ −L3(h3),
h′2 = p1 + i
′
1,
h4 = Γ4(h3)h3,
c3 ≥ 0, c′1 ≥ 0 and i′1 ≥ 0. Since young children are not allowed to borrow on their own, the only
constraint on borrowing is that imposed on young parents. The expectation of V4 is taken over
the earnings shock the young parent will receive as an old parent.
The problem facing an old parent with an old child is given by:
V4(h4, ²4, a4, h′2, θ
′) = max
c4,a5,c′2,i
′
2,a
′
3
{
u(c4) + βV5(h5, a5) + ρ
[
u(c′2) + βEθ′′,²′3
(
V3(h′3, ²
′
3, a
′
3, θ
′′|θ′))]}
subject to
a′3 + a5 = Ra4 +W (h4, ²4) +W2 − c4 − c′2 − i′2(1− s2),
a′3 ≥ W2 − c′2 − i′2(1− s2),
a5 ≥ −L4(h4),
a′3 ≥ −L2(h′3),
h′3 = f(h
′
2, p2 + i
′
2, θ
′),
h5 = Γ5(h4)h4,
c4 ≥ 0, c′2 ≥ 0 and i′2 ≥ 0. The second constraint ensures that parental transfers are non-negative.
Both the old parent and the old child face constraints on their borrowing as shown in the third
and fourth constraints. The expectation of V3 is taken over the earnings shock the old child will
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receive as a young parent and the ability level of the future grandchild, θ′′, conditional on the
ability of the child, θ′.
The problem facing a post-parent with no child at home is a standard lifecycle consump-
tion/savings problem:
V5(h5, a5) = max
a6
{u(Ra5 +W (h5)− a6) + βu(Ra6)}.
This is easily solved analytically (given our assumed utility function below) and incorporated into
the old parent’s problem.
4 An Empirically Based Quantitative Analysis
In our computational analysis, we assume a finite number of investment and ability levels but a
continuum of asset levels. The finite investment and ability grids imply a finite number of human
capital levels.
We assume a CES human capital production function, as in equation (2), and a CIES utility
function, given by
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , σ ≥ 0.
4.1 Calibration
We use data from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS), National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), and CNLSY to calibrate our model to the U.S. economy.21 The
six model periods are mapped into ages 0-11, 12-23, 24-35, 36-47, 48-59, and 60-71. We consider
four values of i2 associated with different observed schooling levels: high school dropouts (less
than 12 years of completed schooling), high school graduates (exactly 12 years of completed
schooling), some college (13-15 years of completed schooling), and college graduates (16 or more
years of completed schooling). An annual interest rate of r = 0.05 is assumed throughout, so
R = (1 + r)12 = 1.7959. We assume β = R−1. All earnings are in 2008 dollars (deflated by the
CPI-U). We normalize w = 1, so human capital is measured in 2008 dollars per year. Finally, we
choose the preference parameter σ = 2, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption of 0.5. This is consistent with estimates in the literature (Browning, Hansen and
Heckman 1999).
We assume that income shocks are iid log normally distributed.
21In this analysis, we use NLSY79 and Children of the NLSY79 collected through 2010 and CPS data from 2006.
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Assumption 3. ²j ∼ logN(m, s2), for j = 3, 4.
We also assume a two-state Markov process for ability.
Assumption 4. θ ∈ {θ1, θ2} with Pr(θj = θ′j) = pij for j = 1, 2.
Along with using data to guide our choice for the investment grids, the following parameters
must be determined empirically: potential earnings in school (W2), post-school income shock
distributions (m, s), human capital growth rates (Γ4,Γ5), the human capital production function,
(a, b, d), the Markov process for ability (θ1, θ2, pi1, pi2), parental altruism towards children (ρ), and
the debt constraints (γ). We first discuss parameters that are chosen to match data outside of
the model and then outline the calibration process for all remaining parameters.
4.1.1 Second Period Earnings and Investment Costs
We directly estimate potential earnings for ages 12-23, W2, using the CNLSY. We also estimate
foregone earnings from these data, which are combined with direct educational expenditures
by schooling level (from the Digest of Education Statistics 2008) to determine second period
investment amounts, i2.
Using the random sample of the CNLSY, we estimate the discounted present value of average
earnings for high school dropouts over ages 16-23.22 Dividing the average annual discounted
income over this period by 12 yields an annualized potential income measure of W2 = 11, 187.
This also reflects the total amount of foregone earnings for individuals in our highest schooling
category: college completion. Foregone earnings for ‘high school graduates’ (those with ‘some
college’) are given by the discounted present value of earnings for dropouts over ages 16-18 (16-
20), dividing by 12 to annualize the amounts. We assume no foregone earnings for high school
dropouts, since individuals cannot typically work before age 16.
We distinguish between total investment amounts and the amount privately paid by indi-
viduals themselves, since education is heavily subsidized in the U.S. Total investment amounts
include foregone earnings and total public and private education expenditures. Consider first the
investments made by old children ages 12-23. To calculate expenditures associated with grades
6-12, we use average expenditure per pupil for all public elementary and secondary schools. For
the schooling category ‘some college’, we add two years of current-fund expenditures per student
at all post-secondary institutions to the costs of high school. For ‘college graduates’, we add
five years of current-fund expenditures per student at four-year post-secondary institutions to
22A discount rate of r = 0.05 was used to discount earnings to age 18.
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the costs of high school.23 Combining foregone earnings with direct expenditures and dividing
by 12 to annualize the amounts, we obtain total investment amounts (p2 + i2) of $3,563, $5,912,
$13,369, and $29,805 for high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, and college
graduates, respectively.
Foregone earnings are borne by individuals, but we assume that primary and secondary school-
ing is otherwise publicly provided at no private cost. Since dropping out of high school entails
no foregone earnings or other private costs, we set p2 = 3, 563. This amount is subtracted from
total investment amounts to obtain private i2 investments (inclusive of marginal subsidies) of $0,
$2,260, $9,374, and $25,082 for high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, and
college graduates, respectively. High school graduates only pay foregone earnings (roughly two-
fifths of their total investment), while college students pay both foregone earnings and a share of
direct costs, which are heavily subsidized. Dividing revenue from tuition and fees by total rev-
enue for all degree-granting post-secondary institutions in 1995-96 suggests that student tuition
payments account for only 28% of college revenues. Altogether, individuals pay roughly 40% of
their total marginal costs of finishing high school and about 55-60% of the total marginal costs of
college. Striking a balance between these figures, we set the second period marginal investment
subsidy rate to s2 = 0.5.
Since there are no forgone earnings for young children, we take the annualized value of $3,563
as the minimum period one investment.24 Assuming this level of investment is completely subsi-
dized for young children, we set p1 = 3, 563 and consider a grid for period one private investments
i1 ranging from zero to $15,000, an amount very few parents wish to invest.25 We set s1 = 0,
since private investments by parents in their young children are not typically subsidized in the
U.S.
4.1.2 Earnings Growth Rates
We set Γ4(h3) and Γ5(h4) to match growth in average income levels, E[W (h4, ²4)]/E[W (h3, ²3)] =
1.478 and E[W (h5)]/E[W (h4, ²4)] = 1.077, using data from the NLSY79 and 2006 March CPS,
23All schooling expenditure figures are taken from the Digest of Education Statistics (2008) and are adjusted to
year 2008 dollars using the CPI-U. Primary and secondary expenditures ($8,552 per year) are based on averages
over the 1990-91 to 1994-95 period (Table 181). Post-secondary expenditures are based on all degree-granting
institutions in 1995-96 (Table 360). Annual expenditures per student are $25,902 at two-year institutions and
$32,712 at four-year institutions.
24This corresponds to the sum of average annual expenditures per pupil of $8,552 for grades 1–5 divided by 12
(to annualize the amount).
25Our grid for early investments includes seven points from 0 to 15,000, with equally spaced increments of 2,500.
Modest changes in the number of grid points or the upper limit produce very similar results.
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respectively.26 This approach assumes that individuals face the same expected growth in earnings
regardless of their human capital level. Because earnings shocks ²3 and ²4 are non-negative,
different human capital growth rates are needed for each level of human capital to produce the
same growth rates in expected earnings.
4.1.3 Calibrating other Parameters Using Simulated Method of Moments
The remaining parameters are calibrated by simulating the model and comparing the resulting
allocations with those observed in the data. In particular, we determine parameters of the earn-
ings shock distribution (m, s), the human capital production function (a, b, d), parental altruism
towards their children (ρ), the ability distribution (θ1, θ2, pi1, pi2), and the debt constraint pa-
rameter (γ). We use a simulated method of moments procedure, which chooses parameters to
best fit moments for educational and earnings dynamics using data from the CNLSY. This step
requires fully solving the dynastic fixed point problem of Section 3 in steady state, simulating
a number of conditional moment conditions, and comparing those moments with their empirical
counterparts. In particular, we fit moments related to (i) the education distribution, (ii) the
distribution of annual earnings for men ages 24-35 and 36-47 in the NLSY79, (iii) child schooling
levels conditional on parental income and maternal schooling, and (iv) child wages at ages 24-35
conditional on their own educational attainment, maternal schooling, and parental income levels
(when the child is ages 0-11). Appendix C provides greater detail on the calibration.
Table 2 shows the distribution of educational attainment for our NLSY calibration sample
along with the calibrated steady state distribution produced by our model. While the model
matches high school completion and college attendance rates quite well, it under-predicts college
completion rates.
To help identify the earnings shock distribution and human capital levels, we match the mean
and standard deviation of earnings from the random sample of men in the NLSY79 ages 24-35
and 36-47 (discounted to ages 30 and 42, respectively, using a 5% interest rate). Table 3 reports
these statistics in the NLSY79 and the calibrated steady state for our model. In all cases, except
the standard deviation of wages for old parents, the model matches the data quite well.
Child educational attainment (i′2 in our model) should depend on early investments, child
ability levels, second period parental income, and parental assets. Not all of these are observed in
the NLSY data; however, we can simulate our model to fit Pr(i′2|Y3, Y4, i2) where Y3 and Y4 reflect
26In both cases, we use data for men deflated to year 2008 dollars. We discount within period earnings to ages
30, 42, and 54 using a 5% interest rate. We drop observations for respondents with annual earnings less than $200
or greater than $275,000 or those with less than 9 years of completed schooling.
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total parental earnings in early and late parenthood. In practice, we condition on three categories
of parental incomes Y3 and Y4: bottom quartile, second quartile, and top half of the age-specific
income distribution. These moments are most useful in identifying the credit constraint parameter
γ, the complementarity of early and late investments, parental altruism, and the intergenerational
correlation in ability. Proposition 2 shows that the extent to which early vs. late income affect
educational attainment helps identify the importance of early borrowing constraints and the
degree of dynamic complementarity. Later borrowing constraints and the extent of parental
altruism also determine the relationship between parental income and child investments, but not
the relative importance of early vs. late income. When any borrowing constraint or the non-
negative transfer constraint binds, stronger altruism implies greater investment for any given
level of parental income. Altogether, γ, b and ρ can be identified from the relationship between
parental incomes and educational attainment as long as some families face binding constraints.
The correlation between the educational attainment of children and parents for given income
levels is useful for identifying the intergenerational correlation in abilities.
Table 4 reports the child’s education distribution by parental education for our model and
the NLSY79 data, while Table 5 shows the education distribution by parental income when the
child is young and old.27 Educational attainment is strongly increasing in parental education and
income. The model slightly over-predicts the importance of parental education for high school
completion, while it under-predicts its importance for college attendance and completion. The
intergenerational correlation in i2 investment amounts is 0.33 for our model and 0.32 in the NLSY
data.
A few interesting patterns emerge from Table 5 when we simultaneously condition on both
early and late parental income. Considering college completion, late income is relatively unimpor-
tant conditional on early income, while the reverse is not true. Early income is quite important
for college even after conditioning on later income. These patterns are clearly evident in both the
NLSY data and our model. When looking at high school completion, the model suggests that
both early and late income are important (conditional on the other), while the NLSY suggests
a more modest role for late parental income. Overall, the model replicates key features of the
relationship between child educational attainment and parental education and income. As noted
earlier, these relationships are central for identifying the human capital production technology
and borrowing limits.
27See Appendix C for the full set of moments (i.e. child education by parental education and income at young
and old ages) used in calibration along with their steady state counterparts.
27
Wages during early adulthood depend on human capital levels, h′3. Conditional on schooling i′2,
human capital and wages should be increasing in early childhood investments and the child’s raw
ability. Thus, we also fit E(W ′3|Y3, i2, i′2), using wage income for youth ages 24-35 as our measure
of W3 and three income categories for Y3 as described above.28 These moments are helpful in
identifying parameters of the human capital production function, including the distribution of
ability and its intergenerational correlation. Appendix C reports these moments in the data and
our calibrated steady state.
Our calibrated parameter values are reported in Table 6. A value of b = −1.1 implies an
elasticity of substitution between early investments and late investments of 0.48 – strong dynamic
complementarity similar to that estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010). The model
implies a similar weight on early and late investments, with a near one-half. Values for θ suggest
that high ability individuals are roughly 2.5 times as productive as their low ability counterparts.
Our calibration implies modest intergenerational persistence in ability: high ability parents have
a high ability child 76% of the time, while low ability parents only have a high ability child 41%
of the time. The calibrated value of ρ = 0.67 is far from ‘pure altruism’, but it still implies that
considerable value is placed on children and grandchildren. Finally, our calibrated value for γ
implies that individuals can only borrow up to 45% of their minimal discounted lifetime earnings
at any age.29 Thus, credit limits are far more stringent than the ‘present value’ limit of Aiyagari
(1994).
4.2 Additional Features of the Baseline Steady State
Table 7 shows how average early (i1) and late (i2) private investment amounts vary with parental
education in our benchmark steady state. On average, parents annually invest $2,121 in their
young children and $7,227 in their older children. (Because of the 50% marginal subsidy on
late investments, private investment expenditures for older children are only $3,864.) Private
investments in young (old) children are roughly five (four) times as great for the children of college
graduates compared to high school dropouts. Kaushal, Magnuson, and Waldfogel (2011) find
28Given enough data, we could fit E(W ′3|Y3, Y4, i2, i′2). However, conditioning on Y4 probably adds little additional
identifying variation, since only i′1 and θ
′ affect expected wages conditional on i′2 and these are largely determined
by Y3 and i2. Note that we use weekly earnings for our measure of W3 (due to data availability and the desire
to best capture differences in human capital), while we use the distribution of annual earnings for men in helping
identify earnings growth and the distribution of shocks (as described above). Since the units for these are quite
different, we fit the ratio of E(W ′3|Y3, i2, i′2) for each category of (Y3, i2, i′2) relative to the corresponding average
for a baseline group of high school graduates with high school graduate mothers whose early parental income is in
the lowest quartile. See Appendix C for additional details.
29This implies average limits for L2, L3 and L4 of $14,835, $19,177, and $17,528, respectively.
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that high school dropout parents spend $825 per child, annually on educational enrichment, while
parents that graduated from college spend $4,671.30 Aggregating early and late private investment
expenditures (i.e. i1+(1−s2)i22 ), we obtain very comparable measures: $1,115 and $4,873, for high
school dropout and college graduate parents, respectively.
Our calibrated steady state suggests that roughly half of all young parents and 12% of all old
parents are borrowing at their limit, while no older youth are borrowing constrained. The share
of young parents that are borrowing constrained is greater among those who attended (60%) or
completed (68%) college relative to those who only finished high school (38%) or who dropped out
(51%). This relationship is non-monotonic: high school graduates are less likely to be constrained
than high school drop outs and college attendees and graduates. These patterns are consistent
with a relatively high demand for credit among young high school dropouts that experience a
bad income shock. For them, a low earnings shock is quite costly given already low expected
income levels. More educated young parents tend to be constrained for other reasons. First,
many already have debt from their own education. Second, more educated parents desire more
credit to fund higher levels of investment in their children, since their children are more likely to
be of high ability.
The share of old parents that are borrowing constrained is monotonically increasing in educa-
tional attainment. Adverse income shocks at older ages increase the demand for credit less than
at younger ages (especially for the least educated), since expected income levels are higher due
to lifecycle wage growth and retirement is closer. Even though none of the older youth are bor-
rowing constrained, the possibility of binding future borrowing constraints (during parenthood)
may affect their current human capital investment behavior.
In our calibrated steady state, roughly 5% of all older parents are ‘transfer’ constrained,
transferring zero to their old children. Unlike borrowing constraints, the least educated parents
are most likely to be transfer constrained (15% of high school dropouts make zero transfers to
their older children while all college graduates make a positive transfer). This relationship is
driven by the fact that less-educated parents are more likely to have low income relative to what
their children can expect to earn. Most high school dropouts are of low ability; however, 40% of
those with low ability will have a high ability child. Without the non-negative transfer constraint,
many of these parents would effectively take resources from their children.
30See Table 3 of the online appendix from Kaushal, Magnuson, and Waldfogel (2011). Amounts reported here
exclude enrichment spending allocated to parents.
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5 Policy Analysis
We next simulate a series of policies to emphasize important economic forces affecting investment
in human capital. In particular, we focus on policies that shed light on the interaction between
borrowing constraints and investments at different ages. Intergenerational linkages through en-
dogenous parental transfers play a key role in our analysis. First, we consider different loan
policies to determine the importance of borrowing constraints at different stages of child develop-
ment. We differentiate between the short- and long-run effects of increased borrowing, where the
latter accounts for changes in human capital and asset distributions through intergenerational
linkages. Second, we study fiscally equivalent early and late investment subsidy policies. Com-
paring these policies demonstrates the strong interaction between dynamic complementarity and
early borrowing constraints. We also discuss the quantitative importance of incorporating early
investment responses to policies that target subsidies at later ages. Third, we consider the effects
of increasing the level of early public investment. This exercise underscores how different policies
can target different ends of the education distribution. Lastly, we compare the effects of income
transfers with those of loans. Here, we distinguish between “current” and “future” effects of these
policies on investment. As noted earlier, policies that change the budget/borrowing constraints
for parents not only affect children through parental transfer decisions (“current” effects); they
also affect investment decisions by changing the returns to investment when children become par-
ents themselves (“future” effects). This highlights the importance of considering the full effects of
lasting policy changes in a dynamic intergenerational environment even if one is only interested
in short-term responses.
5.1 Increasing Borrowing Limits
Given the level of complementarity that we find between early and late investments and the
fact that borrowing constraints bind for many young parents in our baseline steady state, our
analytical results suggest that relaxing early borrowing constraints should lead to increases in
investment during both early and late childhood. To investigate this quantitatively, we simulate
the ‘short-run’ and ‘long-run’ responses to a permanent $2,500 increase in the borrowing limit for
all young parents (leaving all other borrowing limits unchanged). The effects this has on early and
late investments in children and on their average post-school wages are reported in Table 8. By
‘short-run’, we refer to responses of the first generation to be fully affected by the policy change.
By ‘long-run’, we refer to decisions in the new steady state many generations later. The former
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shows how families respond to the policy, given the distribution of assets and human capital in
the baseline steady state, while the latter takes into account the fact that parental asset and
human capital distributions change over time in response to expanded borrowing opportunities.
Focusing first on short-run impacts, Table 8 reveals that relaxing borrowing constraints on
young parents would lead to sizeable increases in both early and late investments in children.
Increases in early investments would be greatest among children from more educated households.
This partly reflects the fact that college educated parents are the most likely to be borrowing
constrained. It is also due to the fact that more educated parents want additional credit to bolster
investment, while constrained high school dropouts appear to desire additional credit primarily to
help smooth consumption. Parents with a college degree would increase early investments in their
children by 19% on average, while there would be no early investment response among parents
that dropped out of high school. Despite the lack of an early investment response among less-
educated parents, their children are more likely to complete high school (with negligible average
impacts on their final human capital and wage outcomes). Older children are willing to take on
more debt to invest in their education, because they know they will be able to borrow more when
they become young parents themselves (when they are likely to be constrained). As highlighted
in Proposition 1, even if a person is not currently borrowing up to his debt limit, his investment
decisions are adversely affected by the possibility of future binding constraints. Among children
whose parents attended or completed college, effects on high school completion are small (almost
all already complete high school) while there are sizeable increases in the probability of finishing
college. The combined effects of increased early and late investment on average wage levels upon
labor market entry are as high as 3.6% for the children of college graduates. Average short-run
increases in wages among all young workers are about 1.5%.
The right half of Table 8 reports the long-run changes in investment and wages in the new
steady state (many generations later). These changes incorporate the fact that many older chil-
dren borrow more and find themselves in greater debt when they become young parents. While
constraints on young parents are less likely to bind, more older parents (especially those with
lower education levels) become borrowing and transfer constrained (see Table 9). Asset distribu-
tions at all ages shift left. Despite the fact that constrained persons with any given level of assets
and human capital are likely to invest more in their children (this is precisely what the short-run
effects demonstrate), the long-run shifts in asset distributions lead to lower overall early invest-
ment levels. This is most pronounced for children from the least educated families; although, the
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16% drop in average i1 among these families is only about $100 given their low initial investment
levels. Due to dynamic complementarity, these drops in early investment are accompanied by
reductions in college completion rates among children of less-educated parents; however, high
school completion rates actually increase slightly. By contrast, long-run responses by children of
college graduates are more positive for both early and late investments.
These results suggest that relaxing borrowing constraints on young parents can be a double-
edged sword in terms of investment in human capital. In the short-run, there are obvious gains
in human capital investment among constrained families. Although the increased borrowing
opportunities do not directly benefit unconstrained parents, they benefit their children and future
generations who may become constrained. Parents take some of the ‘family’ gains by transferring
less to their children. While this is good in terms of ‘family’ or ‘dynastic’ welfare, it can saddle
future generations with more debt. This debt gets passed on across generations through smaller
financial transfers and, in some cases, less human capital investment. In the long-run, asset
distributions shift left and investment declines slightly. In general, these forces appear to be most
pronounced at the bottom of the education distribution. While one may not typically be concerned
about outcomes many generations into the future, we observe long-run-like investment responses
for second- and third-generations affected by the policy. These results, therefore, underscore the
importance of considering long-run policy impacts along with more immediate effects on current
generations. They also highlight the fact that some policies may have important indirect effects
on asset accumulation if future generations are affected: a policy may cause current generations
to respond even if they themselves are not directly affected by the policy.
Because old children are not borrowing constrained in our baseline steady state, relaxing their
borrowing limits has no effect on investment behavior.31 Yet, this does not mean that investment
decisions for old children are optimal (even conditional on early investment choices), since many
of these children will face binding constraints as young and old parents. Still, allowing them to
borrow more as old children does nothing to alleviate these future constraints.
Relaxing constraints on older parents has fairly small effects. While this enables parents to
smooth their consumption and transfer more wealth to their children, the magnitude of new trans-
fers is small and has little effect on children’s investment behavior. In the long-term, the increase
in parental transfers prevents the type of leftward shift in the asset distribution observed with
increased borrowing for young parents. As a result, the long-run effects of increasing borrowing
31This result is roughly consistent with with findings of Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010).
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opportunities for older parents are positive and larger than the short-run effects, although they
are still quite small. In the long-run, increasing loan limits for older parents by $2,500 increases
average early investment by 1.5%, average late investment by 2.3%, and average wages of young
parents by .3%.
5.2 Subsidizing Education
We next study the consequences of increasing subsidy rates for early and late human capital
investments. This analysis highlights the implications of dynamic complementarity in investments
and borrowing constraints when considering policies targeted to different stages of development.
In comparing the effects of subsidies to early and late investments, we increase s1 and s2 so
that total expenditures on all education subsidies increase by roughly the same amount. Given
the complementarity of early and late human capital investments, subsidizing investments at one
age will tend to increase investments at all ages. Because s2 > 0 in the baseline economy, the
total cost of subsidizing early investment includes both the direct cost associated with raising
s1 and the indirect cost associated with any increase in subsidized late investments. Since early
investments are not subsidized in the baseline economy, an increase in s2 only entails direct costs
for additional outlays on second period investment.32
Table 10 shows the short- and long-run effects of subsidizing early and late investments on
average investments, the percent who graduate from high school and college, and average entry
wage outcomes. The first row reports the effects of subsidizing early human capital investment
at a rate of 10%. The per capita total cost of this policy is about $900, with roughly two-
thirds of this coming from the increased costs associated with subsidies for late investments.
Not surprisingly, there are large increases in early investments in both the short- and the long-
run (28% and 34%, respectively). Because investments are so complementary, this policy also
increases late investments by roughly 12% in the short-run and 17% in the long-run. Most of
the changes in the education distribution come from increases at the upper end. The percent
who graduate college increases 30% in the short-run and 40% in the long-run. Changes in high
school completion rates are negligible. Average post-school wages increase 3.1% in the short-run
and 3.9% in the long-run. Unlike increases in borrowing limits, increased subsidy rates do not
produce leftward shifts in asset distributions, since they enable families to invest more in their
children without spending much more out-of-pocket.
32The total per capita cost of increasing s1 from zero to s
′
1 is given by s
′
1 i¯1(s
′
1, s2) + s2 [¯i2(s
′
1, s2) − i¯2(0, s2)],
where i¯j(s1, s2) reflects average investment in period j under subsidy policy (s1, s2). The total cost of increasing
subsidies to late investment is s′2 i¯2(0, s
′
2)− s2 i¯2(0, s2).
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We next consider the effects of increasing the subsidy to late investments from 50% to 53% at
a cost of roughly $900 in the new steady state. We begin by discussing the effects of this policy
when parents are aware of the higher subsidy rate when their children are young (row two of Table
10). Thus, both early and late investments may respond. We then discuss the short-term impact
on families who are unaware of the policy when making early investments in their children, so
only late investments respond (row three of Table 10). This effectively measures the short-run
effects for families with older children when the policy is first announced and introduced.
The second row of Table 10 shows the effects of increasing s2 on families who are aware of the
program when their children are young. Although this policy costs the same as a 10% subsidy to
early investment, it has much weaker effects on human capital accumulation. Early investments
increase by only 4% and 7% in the short- and long-run, respectively, compared with 30-40% for
the early investment subsidy. Perhaps more surprisingly, increases in average late investments are
quite similar to those for an increase in early investment subsidies. (Notably, simulated effects
on college attendance rates are consistent with typical estimates of the impacts of tuition and
financial aid on college attendance in the U.S.)33 While late subsidies have weaker impacts on
college completion compared to early subsidies, they appear to increase high school graduation
rates more. Altogether, these investment responses imply a much smaller increase (1.4% in the
short-run and 1.8% in the long-run) in average entry wage rates relative to a policy that subsidizes
early investment.
These results underscore the important interaction between credit constraints and the dynamic
complementarity of early and late investments in human capital. The fact that many young
parents are credit constrained means that they cannot easily finance additional early investments
in response to policies targeted to later ages. While unconstrained families increase both early
and late investments in response to an increase in s2, constrained young parents are limited
in how much they can increase investments in their young children. Complementarity implies
that if children do not receive adequate early investments, it may not be worth it for parents
to make later investments, even if they are heavily subsidized. By contrast, early investment
subsidies enable families to increase investments in their young children without having to sacrifice
current consumption or borrow more. Those early investments can then be matched with later
33Our s2 increase of 0.03 is roughly equivalent to a $1,300 reduction in annual tuition for the first two years of
college. Our simulations suggest that this increases college attendance (i.e. some college or more) by 5-6 percentage
points (depending on whether early investments are allowed to adjust). Kane (2006) and Deming and Dynarski
(2009) provide recent surveys of the related empirical literature, concluding that a $1,000 reduction in tuition leads
to a 3-5 percentage point increase in college attendance.
34
investments, when constraints are less stringent.
Row three of Table 10 reports the effects of an increase in s2 that is announced after early
investments have already been made. Looking at the short-term impact of this policy, we see
more modest effects on late investment and human capital accumulation, because early invest-
ment is held fixed. Overall, average late investment increases about 8.7%, a little more than half
the effect observed when early investment is also able to adjust. This, coupled with no change
in early investment, produces a much smaller increase in wages (0.6% vs. 1.4% when early in-
vestment adjusts). Increases in high school completion rates are quite similar whether or not
early investment is able to adjust; yet, effects on college completion are negligible when early
investment cannot respond, compared to a 23% increase when it can. In order for college to be
productive, substantial early investments are needed. This is less true for high school.
These results demonstrate the importance of accounting for the interaction between early and
late investments when considering education policies. Assuming that early investments and skill
levels are fixed when analyzing policies that affect high school or college attendance decisions is
not innocuous. Due to dynamic complementarity in investment, failing to account for adjustments
in early investment not only neglects those responses, but it also leads one to underestimate the
policy’s true impact on late investments. Together, these imply substantial underestimation of
policy effects on human capital and wages (except, of course, for those families with older children
at the time of the policy change). Our results suggest that failure to account for early investment
responses would cause researchers to underestimate the full impact of post-secondary subsidies
on wages by almost 60%.34
5.3 Public Provision of Early Investment
We next discuss the effects of increasing the amount of publicly provided early investment. Con-
ceptually, changes in p1 and s1 are quite different. While an increase in the subsidy lowers the
price of and encourages investment for all families, an increase in public investments primarily
increases investments among those children who initially receive little or no private investment.
Among families making sizeable private investments, any increase in public investment largely
crowds out private investment. In fact, an increase in public investment is equivalent to an income
transfer for any families initially investing more than the increase in p1. By contrast, children who
34It is worth noting that these concerns not only apply to structural models of schooling decisions, but they
also apply to more standard regression or differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of tuition or financial
aid changes on college attendance. These strategies may identify the very short-run effects on older cohorts of
college-age children when the policy is implemented, but they are unlikely to identify the medium-term effects on
younger or future cohorts.
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initially receive very little or no early private investments cannot reduce their private investments
in response. For these children, total early investments increase one-for-one with increases in
public investments.
We consider a public early investment increase of $322, equivalent in cost to the early and late
subsidies studied earlier.35 On average, this increase crowds out $116 of early private investment,
which is 36% of the added public investment. High school completion rates increase by 12%, and
the fraction that attends some college (or more) increases by 25%. Because the policy mainly
increases total early investment for those who invest very little to begin with, it has no effect on
college completion rates. Average wages increase by 1%, roughly one-third of the response to an
increase in early subsidy rates.
It is noteworthy that increasing early public investments (p1) and early subsidies (s1) affect
educational outcomes at opposite ends of the distribution. A modest increase in p1 does not raise
early investments enough to make college completion worthwhile for those who were investing
little to begin with. By contrast, an increase in s1 encourages those who were already making
investments to invest more, pushing many of them across the college completion threshold. Yet,
modest early investment subsidies are ineffective at raising high school completion rates, since
most dropouts appear to be at a ‘corner’ solution during early childhood, wishing to invest less
than is already publicly provided for free. Of course, these are precisely the children whose early
investments increase one-for-one with increases in p1.
5.4 Income Transfers
Lastly, we investigate the short-run effects of income transfer policies on human capital investment
and wages. Table 11 reports the investment effects of a $2500 income transfer to young parents
and, for comparison, the effects of a $2500 increase in their borrowing limits. The loan policy
provides liquidity only, while income transfers generate both liquidity and wealth effects. We
distinguish between the short-run effects of these policies if implemented for a single generation
(i.e. a “one-time” policy) or if put in place permanently for current and all future generations.
One-time parental loan or transfer policies indirectly affect children through parental transfers,
consistent with the “current” effects discussed in Section 2.1.3. A permanent introduction of these
policies would also directly affect today’s children in the future when they become adults/parents.
Thus, permanent policy changes induce both “current” and “future” effects.
According to Table 11, the effects of a permanent transfer policy on both early and late
35The total cost includes the increase in late investment subsidies that result from increases in i2.
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investments are smaller than the effects of a one-time transfer policy. This is consistent with
negative “future” effects as discussed in Proposition 5. The opposite is true for a loan policy,
implying positive “future” effects of expanded borrowing opportunities. This, too, is consistent
with Proposition 5, which shows that the “future” effects are more positive for increased borrowing
opportunities than for income transfers when parents are borrowing constrained.
The relative impacts of loan and transfer policies depend on whether we consider permanent
vs. one-time policy implementations. Offering $2500 in financial transfers to a single generation
of young parents increases the average human capital and wage levels of their children more than
a policy that increases their borrowing limits by the same amount. The opposite is true if these
policies were to be put in place permanently. While both permanent loan and income transfer
policies targeted to young parents would increase investment and wage levels for today’s children,
the loan policy has nearly twice the effects due to the strong negative “future” effects of an income
transfer policy.
These results emphasize the importance of taking intergenerational effects into account when
evaluating policy. The short-term effect on wages of the one-time transfer policy is 37% greater
than if that policy were put in place permanently. By contrast, the short-term wage effects of
the one-time loan policy are 67% smaller than its permanent counterpart.
6 Conclusion
We show that family income received at earlier ages of child development improves educational
outcomes more than income received at later ages. Our estimates from the CNLSY suggest that
a $10,000 increase in discounted annual income from birth to age 11 would reduce the probability
of high school dropout by about 2.5 percentage points and increase college attendance rates by
as much as 4.6 percentage points. The same increase in income over ages 12-23 has much smaller
and statistically insignificant effects on these educational outcomes. The timing of family income
is important, consistent with early borrowing constraints.
Our theoretical analysis of borrowing constraints and multi-period human capital investment
establishes the central role played by dynamic complementarity. When investments are suffi-
ciently complementary over the lifecycle, policies that encourage investment in one period tend
to raise investment in other periods as well. When early borrowing constraints bind, increases
in parental income when children are young can have a greater effect on investments at later
ages than increases in income at those ages if early and late investments are sufficiently comple-
37
mentary. Thus, our finding (from the CNLSY) that early parental income has greater effects on
educational attainment than later income implies strong dynamic complementary. Based on this
feature of the data, our calibration identifies a strong degree of dynamic complementarity, and our
quantitative analysis suggests that early and late investments positively co-move in response to
different policies. Our quantitative analysis yields a number of other important general insights.
We find that many young and old parents are borrowing constrained, especially those with
higher education who took out loans to finance their own education and who tend to have high
ability children. However, like Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010), our model suggests
that there would be little impact on human capital investment (‘early’ or ‘late’) from relaxing
borrowing constraints on college-age youth or older parents. At least in the short-run, relax-
ing constraints on young parents would substantially increase both ‘early’ investments in young
children and ‘late’ investments in older children (e.g. high school completion and college). For
example, we find that a modest increase in the borrowing limit faced by young parents would
increase early investment by 11% and college graduation rates by 10%. The effects are greater for
families with more educated parents, since these families are constrained and want more credit
for investment in their children. Less-educated parents want more credit primarily for current
consumption.
We also consider the long-run impacts of permanently relaxing borrowing constraints, allowing
the distribution of assets and human capital to change in response. Here, the results are quite
different. Since relaxing the borrowing constraint for young parents causes families to accumulate
more debt over time, future generations find themselves constrained to nearly the same extent
that initial generations were before the constraint was relaxed. On average, this shift in assets
results in negligible long-run effects of relaxing the constraint on average human capital levels.
Modest increases can be a double-edged sword, increasing human capital in the short-run but
lowering family assets in the long-run.36 These findings suggest that recent concerns about high
student debt levels and their implications for future borrowing capacities may be well-founded.
We explore the impact of subsidies for ‘early’ vs. ‘late’ investment. Two interesting lessons
emerge from this. First, subsidies for investment at either stage of development raise investments
at both stages, calling into question traditional analyses of college-age policies that ignore the
response of early investment. This omission would cause one to under-estimate the final impact
on post-school wages by nearly 60%. Second, subsidies for early investment produce much greater
36Of course, welfare of the dynasty is improved by relaxing the constraint; however, initial generations capture
most of this gain.
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short- and long-run gains in human capital than (fiscally equivalent) subsidies for late investment.
Dynamic complementarity implies that families that are constrained when their children are
young do not fully capitalize on subsidies at later ages, because it is too costly to adjust early
investments. Those that receive inadequate early investments do not find it worthwhile to make
additional later investments (especially college) even if it is heavily subsidized. By contrast,
early investment subsidies enable families to increase investments in their young children without
sacrificing current consumption or borrowing more. Those investments can then be matched with
later investments when constraints are less severe.
In addition to subsidizing private investments, governments also provide a minimum level of
free investment for all children in the form of public schooling. We show that efforts to increase
public investments in young children can be effective in raising early investments and high school
completion rates among children who would otherwise drop out of high school; however, new
public investments largely crowd-out private investment for those who make more modest or
sizeable investments in the first place
If the goal is to raise college completion rates, our results suggest that the most cost-effective
policy is to subsidize early investment (i.e. raise s1). Given strong dynamic complementarity in
investments, college completion is only worthwhile if substantial early investments are also made.
Modest increases in public investments do not raise early investment levels enough to affect col-
lege graduation rates, while investment subsidies at older ages come too late for many constrained
families to make the earlier investments needed for success in college. Early investment subsi-
dies produce sizeable increases in early investments for many children, making more individuals
“college-ready”. If, instead, the goal is to increase high school completion rates, then increases in
publicly provided early investments (and late investment subsidies) are more effective. Modest
early investment subsidies are ineffective, since most dropouts appear to be at a ‘corner’ solution
during early childhood, wishing to invest less than is already publicly provided for free. Of course,
these are precisely the children whose early investments increase one-for-one with improvements
in publicly provided investments. Altogether, these results suggest that the nature of investment
policies can be as important as their timing for determining impacts on early investment and
educational outcomes.
Lastly, we show that it is important to take into account intergenerational effects when eval-
uating policy. A one-shot policy that gives transfers to young parents increases human capital
investments more than an equivalent loan to young parents. However, if the policy is permanently
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put in place, the loan increases human capital investments more. Transfers today decrease the
cost of investment, but transfers tomorrow decrease the benefit of investments. In our framework,
this latter effect is quantitatively important.
Many simplifying assumptions have been made in order to make our intergenerational prob-
lem tractable. Future work should attempt to incorporate a richer structure for family size,
marriage/divorce behavior, and labor supply decisions. Shrinking periods to one or two years
would certainly enrich the nature of human capital production and other important lifecycle is-
sues. General equilibrium concerns also deserve attention. While improvements along these lines
should add credibility to any policy analysis, we have purposely focused on general lessons that
should carry over to and guide future work in this area.
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Appendix A Data from the Children of the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth
We use data from the CNLSY, which follows the children born to all women in the NLSY79. The
mothers in our sample are original NLSY79 respondents from the random sample and were ages
14-22 in 1979 when the survey began.
The data contains measures of family income every year from 1979 to 1994 and biennially
thereafter. Our analysis uses reported earnings for the father and mother as the main measure
of family income. All income measures are deflated to 2008 values using the CPI-U.37
Table 1 also uses a created measure of earned ‘full’ income. This measure uses reported hours
worked by mothers to adjust their earnings to a 1500 hour (30 hours per week) annual equivalent.
Specifically, for all mothers working less than 1500 hours, we multiply reported earnings by 1500
and divide by reported hours. We then add this to father’s earnings to get our measure of earned
‘full’ income.
We discount combined family earnings back to age zero of the child using a 5% annual interest
rate. Our measure of ‘early’ income averages family earnings over child ages zero to eleven, while
our measure of ‘late’ income averages earnings over ages 12-23. These assumptions and age groups
are used in Table 1 and our calibration.
We categorize individuals (mothers and children) with less than 12 years of completed school-
ing as high school dropouts, 12 years of schooling as high school graduates, 13-15 years of schooling
as some college, and 16 or more years of schooling as college graduates. In Table 1, we refer to
those with 13 or more years of completed schooling as having attended college. For children, if
educational attainment is unavailable at age 21 (24), we use reported education at ages 22-24
(25-27). For mothers, we use educational attainment as of age 28 (or ages 29 and 30 if missing
at earlier ages).
The CNLSY contains measures of many child and mother characteristics that may affect edu-
cational attainment. Estimates in Panel B of Table 1 use reported year of child’s birth, indicators
for whether the child is black or hispanic, gender, whether the mother was a teenager when the
child was born, maternal education categories (high school dropout, high school graduate, some
college, college graduate), whether the mother was living in an intact family at age 14, whether
the mother is foreign-born, and the mother’s normed score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT) taken as part of the survey in 1980.
37We impute missing earnings separately for mothers and fathers using individual-specific regressions of log
earnings on an intercept, age and age-squared whenever at least 8 positive values are available and respondents
are age 22 or older. Less than 10% of our final family earnings measures are imputed. Combined family earnings
values of greater than $500,000 and less than $500 are set to missing.
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Appendix B Proofs for Propositions 1-5
Proof of Proposition 1:
Combining FOCs for assets we have:
u′(c1) ≥ βRu′(c2) ≥ (βR)2u′(c3) ≥ (βR)3u′(c4) ≥ (βR)4u′(c5), (13)
where inequalities are strict when the relevant borrowing constraint binds.
(i) Using equations (6) and (13) we have:
u′(c1) ≤ β2wf1
[
u′(c1)
(βR)2
+ β
u′(c1)
(βR)3
Γ4 + β2
u′(c1)
(βR)4
Γ4Γ5
]
= u′(c1)wf1
1
R2
χ,
which implies f1 ≥ R2χ , with strict inequality if any borrowing constraint binds.
(ii) A similar analysis shows that f2 ≥ Rχ , with strict inequality if any of the borrowing
constraints L2, L3, or L4 binds.
(iii) We show that investment falls in at least one period when any borrowing constraint binds
using proof by contradiction. Recall:
f1(i∗1, i
∗
2, θ) > f1(i
u
1 , i
u
2 , θ), (14)
f2(i∗1, i
∗
2, θ) ≥ f2(iu1 , iu2 , θ), (15)
where the latter holds with strict inequality if borrowing limits L2, L3, or L4 bind.
Case (1) Suppose i∗1 = iu1 and i∗2 = iu2 . This contradicts (14).
Case (2) Suppose i∗1 > iu1 and i∗2 = iu2 . Since f11 < 0, this implies that f1(i∗1, i∗2, θ) < f1(iu1 , iu2 , θ),
which contradicts (14).
Case (3) Suppose i∗1 = iu1 and i∗2 > iu2 . Since f22 < 0, this implies that f2(i∗1, i∗2, θ) < f2(iu1 , iu2 , θ),
which contradicts (15).
Case (4) Suppose i∗1 > iu1 and i∗2 > iu2 . If we take the total derivative of f1 at the unconstrained
optimum, we have f11di1+ f12di2 > 0, since i∗1 > iu1 and i∗2 > iu2 by assumption and f1(i∗1, i∗2, θ) >
f1(iu1 , i
u
2 , θ) by (14). Therefore,
di1
di2
< −f12f11 . Similarly, the total derivative of f2 and (15) imply
that di1di2 ≥
−f22
f21
. Together, these imply that f11f22 < f212, which contradicts Assumption 1.
The only cases that remain imply that either i∗1 < iu1 or i∗2 < iu2 . Furthermore, a similar
analysis shows that if f12 > 0, i∗1 < iu1 and i∗2 < iu2 when any borrowing constraint binds. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: (I) Re-write the problem given in equation (5) using Assumption
2 and directly substituting in the budget constraints for c1 and c2. Because we are assuming this
person is constrained as an old child, let a3 = −L2. The decision problem can be written as:
max
i1,i2,a2
u(y1 − i1 − a2) + βu(Ra2 + y2 − i2 + L2) + β2v3(−RL2 + χf(i1, i2, θ)),
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where the constant χ = w(1 + R−1Γ4 + R−2Γ4Γ5) > 0 and the value function v3(·) is defined in
the text by equation (8).
First order conditions for i1, i2 and a2 are:
−u′(c1) + β2v′3(−RL2 + χf(i1, i2, θ))χf1(i1, i2, θ) = 0 (16)
−βu′(c2) + β2v′3(−RL2 + χf(i1, i2, θ))χf2(i1, i2, θ) = 0 (17)
−u′(c1) + βRu′(c2) = 0. (18)
Together, these first order conditions imply f1 = Rf2 at an optimum. Using this with Cramer’s
rule yields (dropping arguments of f(·) and v3(·) for expositional purposes):
∂i1
∂y1
=
β3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)v′3χ(Rf22 − f12)
∆2
> 0,
∂i2
∂y1
=
β3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)v′3χ(f11 −Rf12)
∆2
> 0,
∂i1
∂y2
= R−1 ∂i1∂y1 and
∂i2
∂y2
= R−1 ∂i2∂y1 , where
∆2 ≡ β4R2[u′′(c2)]2χ(v′3f11 + v′′3χf21 ) + β3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)v′3χ(f11 +R2f22 − 2Rf12)
+β4v′3χ
2[u′′(c1) + βR2u′′(c2)][v′3(f11f22 − f212) + v′′3χ(f21 f22 + f22 f11 − 2f1f2f12)] < 0. (19)
All of these expressions are signed using Assumption 1 and f1 = Rf2.
Finally, ∂h3∂yj = f1
∂i1
∂yj
+ f2 ∂i2∂yj > 0 for j = 1, 2, since all terms in this expression are strictly
positive; ∂h3∂y1 = R
∂h3
∂y2
follows directly from the fact that ∂ij∂y1 = R
∂ij
∂y2
for j = 1, 2.
(II) Re-write the problem given in equation (5) assuming a2 = −L1 and Assumption 2:
max
i1,i2,a3
u(y1 − i1 + L1) + βu(−RL1 + y2 − i2 − a3) + β2v3(Ra3 + χf(i1, i2, θ)), (20)
where χ > 0 is defined above. First order conditions for i1, i2 and a3 are:
−u′(c1) + β2v′3(Ra3 + χf(i1, i2, θ))χf1(i1, i2, θ) = 0 (21)
−βu′(c2) + β2v′3(Ra3 + χf(i1, i2, θ))χf2(i1, i2, θ) = 0 (22)
βu′(c2) + β2Rv′3(Ra3 + χf(i1, i2, θ)) = 0. (23)
Combining first order conditions, we have f2 = R/χ. However, f1 > Rf2 = R2/χ since L1 binds
(see Proposition 1).
Cramer’s rule yields (dropping arguments of f(·) and v3(·)):
∂i1
∂y1
=
β3u′′(c1)v′3χf22[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ]
∆1
> 0
∂i1
∂y2
=
−β5Ru′′(c2)v′3v′′3χ2f1f22
∆1
< 0
∂i2
∂y1
=
−β3u′′(c1)v′3χf12[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ]
∆1
∂i2
∂y2
=
β5Ru′′(c2)v′3v′′3χ2f1f12
∆1
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where
∆1 ≡ β3u′′(c1)v′3[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ]χf22 + β5u′′(c2)v′3v′′3χ3f21 f22
+β5[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ](v
′
3)
2χ2[f11f22 − f212] < 0 (24)
by Assumption 1. Clearly, ∂i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0, and ∂i2∂y2 < 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0. Since
∂h3
∂yj
= f1 ∂i1∂yj + f2
∂i2
∂yj
for j = 1, 2, Assumption 1 implies that ∂h3∂y1 > 0 and
∂h3
∂y2
< 0.
(III) Now, re-write problem given in equation (5) assuming a3 = −L2, a2 = −L1, and As-
sumption 2:
max
i1,i2
u(y1 − i1 + L1) + βu(−RL1 + y2 − i2 + L2) + β2v3(−RL2 + χf(i1, i2, θ)) (25)
where χ > 0 is defined above. The first order conditions for i1 and i2 are given by equations (16)
and (17), where c1 = y1 − i1 + L1 and c2 = −RL1 + y2 − i2 + L2.
Cramer’s rule yields (dropping arguments of f(·) and v3(·)):
∂i1
∂y1
=
βu′′(c1)[u′′(c2) + βv′3χf22 + βv′′3χ2f22 ]
∆12
> 0
∂i1
∂y2
=
−β3u′′(c2)χ[v′3f12 + v′′3χf1f2]
∆12
∂i2
∂y1
=
−β2u′′(c1)χ[v′3f12 + v′′3χf1f2]
∆12
∂i2
∂y2
=
βu′′(c2)χ[u′′(c1) + β2v′3χf11 + β2v′′3χ2f21 ]
∆12
> 0
where
∆12 ≡ βu′′(c1)u′′(c2) + β2v′3χ[u′′(c1)f22 + βu′′(c2)f11] + β2v′′3χ2[u′′(c1)f22 + βu′′(c2)f21 ]
+β4(v′3)
2χ2(f11f22 − f212) + β4v′3v′′3χ3[f2(f2f11 − f1f12) + f1(f1f22 − f2f12)] > 0. (26)
Assumption 1 ensures that ∂i1∂y1 ,
∂i2
∂y2
, and ∆12 are strictly positive. Both ∂i1∂y2 and
∂i2
∂y1
are strictly
positive if and only if Condition 1 holds. Using these results for investments, Assumption 1
implies that ∂h3∂yj > 0 for j = 1, 2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Based on the problem discussed in the proof of Proposition 2
part (I), we can apply Cramer’s rule obtaining:
∂i1
∂L2
=
β3u′′(c2)v′3χ[β2R2v′′3χf2 + u′′(c1)](Rf22 − f12)
∆2
> 0
∂i2
∂L2
=
β4Rv′3v′′3χ2f2[u′′(c1) + βR2u′′(c2)](f11 −Rf12) + β3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)v′3χ(f11 −Rf12)
∆2
∈ (0, 1),
where ∆2 < 0 is defined previously by equation (19). All three of these expressions are signed
using Assumption 1 and f1 = Rf2. That ∂i2∂L2 < 1 follows from Assumption 1, f1 = Rf2, and
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f2 < R/χ when L2 binds (see Proposition 1). Finally, ∂h3∂L2 = f1
∂i1
∂L2
+ f2 ∂i2∂L2 > 0, since all terms
in this expression are positive.
(ii) Based on the problem used in the proof of Proposition 2 part (III), Cramer’s rule yields:
∂i1
∂L2
=
β4Rv′3v′′3χ2(f1f22 − f2f12) + β3Ru′′(c2)v′′3χf1 − β3u′′(c2)χ(v′3f12 + χv′′3f1f2)
∆12
∂i2
∂L2
=
βu′′(c2)[u′′(c1) + β2v′3χf11 + β2v′′3χ2f21 ] + β2Ru′′(c1)v′′3χf2 + β4Rv′3v′′3χ2(f2f11 − f1f12)
∆12
∈ (0, 1)
where ∆12 > 0 is defined previously by equation (26). Using Assumption 1, it is clear that ∂i1∂L2 > 0
if Condition 1 holds and that ∂i2∂L2 > 0.
∂i2
∂L2
< 1 follows from Assumption 1 and f2 < R/χ when
L2 binds (see Proposition 1). Assumption 1 further implies that ∂h3∂L2 = f1
∂i1
∂L2
+ f2 ∂i2∂L2 > 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Based on the problem discussed in the proof of Proposition 2
part (II), we can apply Cramer’s rule obtaining:
∂i1
∂L1
=
f22
{
β3u′′(c1)v′3χ[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ] + β5R2u′′(c2)v′3v′′3χ2f1
}
∆1
∈ (0, 1)
∂i2
∂L1
=
−f12
{
β3u′′(c1)v′3χ[u′′(c2) + βR2v′′3 ] + β5R2u′′(c2)v′3v′′3χ2f1
}
∆1
where ∆1 < 0 is defined previously by equation (24). ∂i1∂L1 < 1 follows from χf1 > R
2 and
Assumption 1. Clearly, ∂i2∂L1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0. Finally, ∂h3∂L2 = f1 ∂i1∂L2 + f2 ∂i2∂L2 > 0 by Assumption
1.
(ii) Based on the problem used in the proof of Proposition 2 part (III), Cramer’s rule yields:
∂i1
∂L1
=
βu′′(c1)[u′′(c2) + βv′3χf22 + βv′′3χ2f22 ] + β3Ru′′(c2)χ[v′3f12 + v′′3χf1f2]
∆12
∂i2
∂L1
=
−βRu′′(c2)[u′′(c1) + β2v′3χf11 + β2v′′3χ2f21 ]− β2u′′(c1)χ[v′3f12 + v′′3χf1f2]
∆12
where ∆12 > 0 is defined previously by equation (26). Assumption 1 implies that ∂i1∂L1 < 1. If
Condition 1 does not hold, then v′3f12+v′′3χf1f2 < 0, which implies that
∂i1
∂L1
∈ (0, 1) and ∂i2∂L1 < 0.
¤
Proof of Proposition 5: This proposition alters the problem discussed previously to in-
clude transfers y3 in period 3. We consider two cases, each with binding borrowing constraints
throughout childhood (i.e. a2 = −L1 and a3 = −L2). In the first case, the borrowing constraint
binds during young adulthood (i.e. a4 = −L3), while the constraint is non-binding in the second
(i.e. a4 > −L3).
Case 1: Borrowing constraints bind in periods 1-3. Substituting in all constraints, the decision
problem can be written as:
max
i1,i2
u(y1−i1+L1)+βu(−RL1+y2−i2+L2)+β2u(−RL2+wf(i1, i2; θ)+y3+L3)+β3v4(−RL3+χ˜f(i1, i2; θ)),
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where χ˜ = w[Γ4 +R−1Γ4Γ5].
First order conditions are:
−u′(c1) + [β2wu′(c3) + β3v′4(−RL3 + χ˜f(i1, i2; θ))χ˜]f1(i1, i2; θ) = 0
−βu′(c2) + [β2wu′(c3) + β3v′4(−RL3 + χ˜f(i1, i2; θ))χ˜]f2(i1, i2; θ) = 0.
Below, the arguments for v4(·) and f(·) are dropped to streamline notation.
To simplify certain expressions, it is useful to define the following:
Ω1 ≡ β2u′(c3)w + β3v′4(−RL3 + fχ˜)χ˜ > 0
Ω2 ≡ β2u′′(c3)w2 + β3v′′4(−RL3 + fχ˜)χ˜2 < 0.
Using Cramer’s rule, it is straightforward to show that
∂i1
∂y3
=
−β2wu′′(c3)[βu′′(c2)f1 +Ω1(f1f22 − f2f12)]
∆123
< 0
∂i2
∂y3
=
−β2wu′′(c3)[u′′(c1)f2 +Ω1(f2f11 − f1f12)]
∆123
< 0
∂i1
∂L3
=
[β3Rv′′4 χ˜− β2wu′′(c3)][βu′′(c2)f1 +Ω1(f1f22 − f2f12)]
∆123
>
∂i1
∂y3
∂i2
∂L3
=
[β3Rv′′4 χ˜− β2wu′′(c3)][u′′(c1)f2 +Ω1(f2f11 − f1f12)]
∆123
>
∂i1
∂L3
,
where
∆123 ≡ βu′′(c1)u′′(c2) + u′′(c1)(Ω1f22 +Ω2f22 ) + βu′′(c1)(Ω1f11 +Ω2f21 )
+Ω21(f11f22 − f212) + Ω1Ω2[f2(f2f11 − f1f12) + f1(f1f22 − f2f12)] > 0.
All of these expressions are signed using Assumption 1.
Case 2: Borrowing constraints only bind throughout childhood (periods 1 and 2). Substituting
in all constraints, the decision problem can be written as:
max
i1,i2
u(y1 − i1 + L1) + βu(−RL1 + y2 − i2 + L2) + β2v3(−RL2 + χf(i1, i2; θ) + y3)
where χ > 0 is defined in the text. This problem is identical to that in equation (25) (see part
III of the proof for Proposition 2) with y3 included in the argument for v3(·). As such, the first
order conditions for this problem are the same as in that case (incorporating y3).
Since a4 > −L3 by assumption, we have ∂ij∂L3 = 0 for j = 1, 2. Using Cramer’s rule,
∂i1
∂y3
=
−β3v′′3χ[u′′(c2)f1 + βv′3χ(f1f22 − f2f12)]
∆12
< 0
∂i2
∂y3
=
−β2v′′3χ[u′′(c1)f2 + β2v′3χ(f2f11 − f1f12)]
∆12
< 0,
where ∆12 > 0 is given by equation (26). All expressions are signed using Assumption 1. ¤
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Appendix C Details on Calibration
We calibrate parameters of the earnings shock distribution (m, s), the human capital production
function (a, b, c), parental altruism towards their children (ρ), the ability distribution (θ1, θ2, pi1, pi2),
and the debt constraint parameter γ by simulating the model in steady state to best fit a number
of moments in the NLSY79 and CNLSY data. In particular, we fit moments related to (i) the
education distribution, (ii) the distribution of annual earnings for men ages 24-35 and 36-47 in
the NLSY79, (iii) child schooling levels conditional on parental income and maternal schooling,
and (iv) child wages at ages 24-35 conditional on their own educational attainment, maternal
schooling, and parental income levels (when the child is ages 0-11).
When classifying individuals by education (either mother or child), we categorize them by
highest grade completed (completing less than 12 years of school, 12 years of school, 13-15 years,
or 16 or more years).
We minimize ERR =
4∑
j=1
ωjERRj , where each ERRj represents the error associated with one
of the four sets of moments we fit and ωj is the weight placed on that set of moments. We briefly
describe each of these moments.
ERR1 is the sum of squared differences between the model’s steady state education proba-
bilities and the corresponding sample proportions based on the random sample of all mothers in
the NLSY79 (sample size of 2,478). See Table 2 in the paper for these moments in the data and
our calibrated steady state.
ERR2 reflects differences between moments associated with the model’s steady state earnings
distribution and their corresponding sample moments in the NLSY79 data. Let E(Wj) and
SD(Wj) reflect the mean and standard deviation for steady state wages in period j = 3, 4 for the
model. For corresponding sample moments in the data (Eˆ(Wj) and ŜD(Wj) for j = 3, 4) we use
annual earnings averaged over ages 24-35 and 36-47 (discounted at annual rate r = 0.05 to ages
30 and 42) for the random sample of men in the NLSY79. We then compute
ERR2 =
1
N3 +N4
4∑
j=3
Nj
[
E(W3)− Eˆ(W3)
Eˆ(W3)
]2
+
1
N3 +N4
4∑
j=3
Nj
[
SD(Wj)− ŜD(Wj)
ŜD(Wj)
]2
.
Here, N3 = 2, 696 and N4 = 2, 399 reflect the number of observations used in each age-specific
calculation.
ERR3 is a weighted sum of squared differences between the model’s steady state child educa-
tion probabilities (conditional on parental income in periods 3 and 4 and parental schooling) and
the corresponding sample proportions from the CNLSY. We separate our sample in the model and
data depending on whether parental income (maternal plus paternal earnings) that period is in
quartile 1, quartile 2, or above the median.38 We use the maternal education categories discussed
38In calculating empirical income cutoffs for the first quartile and median, we use the distribution of average
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earlier. To determine child education probabilities, we use highest grade completed at age 21 to
assign high school dropout and completion status, and age 24 to assign college attendance and
completion status. We calculate
ERR3 =
1
N
4∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
3∑
l=1
4∑
m=1
Njklm[P (e′ = j|Y3 = k, Y4 = l, e = m)−Pˆ (e′ = j|Y3 = k, Y4 = l, e = m)]2,
where P (e′ = j|Y3 = k, Y4 = l, e = m) is the steady state probability a child chooses education
category e′ = j conditional on family income categories Y3 = k and Y4 = l, and maternal education
in category e = m. Pˆ (e′ = j|·) reflects the corresponding conditional sample moment in the full
sample of CNLSY. Njklm is the number of observations used in calculating each conditional
moment in the data and N =
∑
j,k,l,m
Njklm.39 Table C1 reports estimated probabilities related to
these moments from the CNLSY data and those obtained from our baseline calibration.
ERR4 reflects the extent to which the model fits period 3 average wages of children conditional
on their own education, parental education, and parental income when they were young. We
classify parental income and education as we did for ERR3 (in the model and data). We use
average child weekly wages over ages 24-35 (all discounted to age 30 using r = 0.05) for children
of the CNLSY.40 Because we consider weekly wages for children (rather than annual income)
to better reflect human capital levels at younger ages, we scale all average wage measures by
those for children with a high school degree, whose mothers had a high school degree, and whose
parental income was in the lowest quartile. We compute
ERR4 =
4∑
k=1
3∑
l=1
4∑
m=1
Nklm
[
E(W ′3|e′ = k, Y3 = l, e = m)− Eˆ(W ′3|e′ = k, Y3 = l, e = m)
Eˆ(W3|e′ = 2, Y3 = 1, e = 2)
]2
,
where E(W3|e′ = k, Y3 = l, e = m) is the average steady state period-three weekly wage W3 for
a child conditional on own education category e′ = k, early parental income category Y3 = l,
and maternal education category e = m. Let Eˆ(W3|·) reflect the corresponding conditional
sample moment in the full sample of CNLSY. Let Nklm be the number of observations used in
calculating each conditional moment in the data and N =
∑
k,l,m
Nklm = 3, 049. Table C2 reports
relative average weekly wages (relative to average wages of high school dropouts from the lowest
early income quartile whose mothers graduated high school) from the CNLSY data and those
obtained from our baseline calibration.
family income over maternal ages 24-35 and 36-47 (discounted at annual rate r = 0.05 to ages 30 and 42) based on
all mothers in the random sample of the NLSY79. We use family income averaged over child ages 0-11 and 12-23
for the CNLSY to categorize children by parental income in periods 3 and 4.
39Njklm depends on the child education category, since we use different ages to determine high school dropout
and graduate vs. some college and college completion. Altogether, our sample includes 3,928 individuals ages 21+
and 2,966 individuals ages 24+.
40We drop observations with weekly wages less than $40 or greater than $2,500. To calculate more precise wage
measures for high school dropouts and graduates, we also include weekly wage measures at ages 22-23 in computing
average wages.
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All of our ERRj errors should be of similar magnitudes given the scaling of various moments.
Reflecting sample sizes used to compute each error, we use weights ω1 = 0.24, ω2 = 0.33, ω3 =
0.10, and ω4 = 0.33. We generally fit all sets of moments well. Our calibration yields ERR =
0.033, with ERR1 = 0.003, ERR2 = 0.07, ERR3 = 0.02, and ERR4 = 0.04.
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Table 2: Calibrated Education Distribution
Education NLSY Data Model
High school graduate or more .82 .79
Some college or more .42 .42
College graduate .19 .13
Table 3: Calibrated Annual Earnings Distributions for Men Ages 24-35 and 36-47
Earnings Statistic NLSY Data Model
Mean (ages 24-35) 40,868 43,889
Standard deviation (ages 24-35) 23,108 26,362
Mean (ages 36-47) 60,392 64,826
Standard deviation (ages 36-47) 41,416 29,444
Table 4: Educational Attainment by Parental Education (Baseline)
Model NLSY Data
High School Some High School Some
Graduate College College Graduate College College
Parental Education or More or More Graduate or More or More Graduate
High School Dropout 0.54 0.18 0.03 0.61 0.23 0.05
High School Graduate 0.77 0.39 0.08 0.78 0.42 0.14
Some College 0.90 0.55 0.20 0.84 0.53 0.21
College Graduate 0.99 0.66 0.30 0.93 0.76 0.46
55
Table 5: Educational Attainment by Parental Income (Baseline)
Parental Income Quartile: Model NLSY Data
High School High School
Early Late Graduate College Graduate College
Ages Ages or More Graduate or More Graduate
1 Any 0.58 0.01 0.65 0.07
2 Any 0.75 0.03 0.79 0.16
3 or 4 Any 0.91 0.24 0.89 0.29
Any 1 0.56 0.06 0.66 0.06
Any 2 0.72 0.11 0.77 0.14
Any 3 or 4 0.93 0.18 0.87 0.29
1 1 0.46 0.01 0.64 0.06
2 1 0.56 0.03 0.73 0.10
3 or 4 1 0.71 0.16 0.90 0.08
1 2 0.56 0.01 0.69 0.08
2 2 0.71 0.03 0.80 0.17
3 or 4 2 0.85 0.24 0.84 0.18
1 3 or 4 0.84 0.01 0.69 0.14
2 3 or 4 0.90 0.03 0.82 0.17
3 or 4 3 or 4 0.96 0.27 0.90 0.34
Table 6: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value
a 0.45
b -1.10
d 0.77
θ1 7.82
θ2 20.00
pi1 0.59
pi2 0.76
m 9.94
s 0.74
ρ 0.67
γ 0.45
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Table 7: Average Baseline Investment Amounts by Parental Education
Parental Education Average i1 Average i2
All Levels 2,121 7,227
High School Dropout 686 3,088
High School Graduate 1,711 5,989
Some College 2,970 9,473
College Graduate 3,643 12,205
Table 8: Effects of Increasing Young Parent’s Borrowing Limit by $2,500
Short-Run Effects (% Change) Long-Run Effects (% Change)
Parental College College
Education Avg. i1 HS+ Grad. Avg. W3 Avg. i1 HS+ Grad. Avg. W3
All Levels 11.0 2.8 10.0 1.5 -0.4 1.7 -1.9 0.0
HS Dropout 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.1 -16.4 2.6 -14.2 -0.8
HS Graduate 9.7 3.9 12.7 1.4 -5.2 1.5 -3.1 -0.6
Some College 9.3 1.7 4.5 1.6 -2.1 0.9 -8.2 -0.4
College Graduate 18.8 0.4 17.6 3.6 10.5 0.3 8.1 2.0
Table 9: Effects of Increasing Young Parent’s Borrowing Limit by $2,500 on Fraction of Con-
strained Young and Old Parents, and Old Children
Fraction of Young Fraction of Old Fraction of Old
Parents Constrained Parents Constrained Parents with y2 = 0
Parental Education Baseline SS New SS Baseline SS New SS Baseline SS New SS
All Levels 0.51 0.46 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.12
High School Dropout 0.51 0.39 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.29
High School Graduate 0.38 0.35 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.14
Some College 0.60 0.56 0.14 0.22 0.01 0.03
College Graduate 0.68 0.66 0.41 0.46 0.00 0.00
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Table 10: Effects of Early and Late Investment Subsidies
Short-Run Effects (% Change) Long-Run Effects (% Change)
Avg. Avg. College Avg. Avg. Avg. College Avg.
Policy i1 i2 HS+ Grad. W3 i1 i2 HS+ Grad. W3
Announced early
s1 = .10 28.1 12.1 0.0 30.5 3.1 34.0 17.0 1.3 39.6 3.9
s2 = .53 4.0 15.5 10.1 22.9 1.4 7.2 18.1 10.9 26.8 1.8
Announced late
s2 = .53 0.0 8.7 10.0 1.4 0.6 7.2 18.1 10.9 26.8 1.8
Table 11: Short-Run Effects of Permanent vs. One-Time Loan and Transfer Policies to Young
Parents
Permanent Policy (% Change) One-Time Policy (% Change)
Policy Avg i1 Avg i2 Avg W3 Avg i1 Avg i2 Avg W3
$2500 Transfer 5.7 4.0 0.8 7.8 5.0 1.1
$2500 Loan 10.9 7.5 1.5 8.4 3.0 1.0
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1 1 203 176
Table C1: Educational Attainment by Maternal Education and Early and Late Parental Income (CNLSY Data and Model)
Parental Income 
Quartile
High School Probabilities College Probabilities
HS Dropout HS Graduate Some College College Graduate
Early Late N Model Data Model Data N Model Data Model Data
A. Mother HS Dropout
1 1 451 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.36 395 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.03
1 2 113 0.60 0.45 0.38 0.40 110 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.04
1 3 or 4 29 0.26 0.41 0.60 0.38 28 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.11
2 1 63 0.58 0.41 0.16 0.44 44 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.02
2 2 104 0.63 0.30 0.16 0.46 93 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.06
2 3 or 4 37 0.12 0.19 0.59 0.49 35 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.14
3 or 4 1 17 0.41 0.12 0.18 0.53 9 0.31 0.44 0.10 0.00
3 or 4 2 58 0.23 0.21 0.38 0.36 39 0.29 0.31 0.10 0.10
3 or 4 3 or 4 68 0.00 0.25 0.59 0.34 55 0.29 0.33 0.12 0.16
B. Mother HS Graduate
1 1 418 0.50 0.34 0.25 0.39 363 0.24 0.26 0.01 0.06
1 2 187 0.34 0.27 0.52 0.40 162 0.14 0.28 0.01 0.07
1 3 or 4 35 0.11 0.40 0.60 0.23 28 0.29 0.21 0.01 0.18
2 1 110 0.35 0.27 0.32 0.45 83 0.28 0.27 0.05 0.12
2 2 214 0.24 0.21 0.49 0.38 165 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.19
2 3 or 4 153 0.08 0.20 0.53 0.39 118 0.37 0.29 0.03 0.15
3 or 4 1 45 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.33 26 0.34 0.50 0.19 0.08
3 or 4 2 149 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.40 95 0.44 0.38 0.19 0.17
3 or 4 3 or 4 378 0.02 0.11 0.30 0.31 250 0.48 0.36 0.20 0.28
C. Mother Some College
0 06. 0 24. 0 48. 0 37. 0 17. 0 31. 0 29. 0 11.
1 2 89 0.19 0.28 0.31 0.37 74 0.40 0.19 0.09 0.14
1 3 or 4 26 0.08 0.04 0.42 0.46 22 0.42 0.45 0.07 0.09
2 1 50 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.46 31 0.61 0.29 0.18 0.16
2 2 116 0.21 0.11 0.41 0.28 87 0.30 0.34 0.07 0.24
2 3 or 4 80 0.11 0.18 0.53 0.34 67 0.32 0.28 0.04 0.24
3 or 4 1 27 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.37 14 0.17 0.43 0.59 0.14
3 or 4 2 76 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.26 44 0.32 0.41 0.32 0.18
3 or 4 3 or 4 263 0.06 0.10 0.30 0.21 167 0.37 0.34 0.27 0.32
D. Mother College Graduate
1 1 20 - 0.15 - 0.35 14 - 0.43 - 0.29
1 2 19 0.00 0.21 0.50 0.42 15 0.00 0.27 0.50 0.13
1 3 or 4 8 0.00 0.38 0.29 0.00 4 0.00 0.25 0.71 0.25
2 1 5 - 0.20 - 0.00 5 - 0.40 - 0.20
2 2 23 0.00 0.09 0.27 0.39 12 0.00 0.42 0.73 0.33
2 3 or 4 21 0.01 0.10 0.29 0.24 15 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.27
3 or 4 1 1 - 0.00 - 1.00 1 - 0.00 - 0.00
3 or 4 2 27 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.26 6 0.00 0.17 0.76 0.67
3 or 4 3 or 4 245 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.12 114 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.58
Notes: High school dropouts (less than 12 years of schooling) and graduates (12 years of completed schooling) measured as 
of age 21.  Some college (13-15 years of completed schooling) and college graduates (16 or more years of completed 
schooling) measured as of age 24. Data from CNLSY. In our baseline steady state, no old parents that graduated from college 
are in the bottom income quartile.
1Table C2: Relative Average Child Wages by Own Education, Early Parental Income, and Maternal Education
(Wages relative to average wages for HS graduates from early income quartile 1 whose mother is a HS graduate)
Child's Education Early Income Quartile Mother's Education N Model Data
HS Dropout 1 HS Dropout 286 0.82 0.92
1 HS Graduate 208 0.82 0.89
1 Some College 74 0.82 0.92
1 College Graduate 7 - 1.23
2 HS Dropout 63 0.82 0.92
2 HS Graduate 96 0.82 0.99
2 Some College 33 0.82 0.88
2 College Graduate 4 0.82 0.83
3 or 4 HS Dropout 28 0.82 1.17
3 or 4 HS Graduate 56 0.82 1.21
3 or 4 Some College 25 0.82 1.42
3 or 4 College Graduate 5 0.82 0.90
HS Graduate 1 HS Dropout 217 1.02 0.95
1 HS Graduate 246 1.00 1.00
1 Some College 114 0.96 0.96
1 College Graduate 13 0.84 0.80
2 HS Dropout 81 0.97 1.08
2 HS Graduate 153 0.99 1.12
2 Some College 61 1.01 1.12
2 College Graduate 11 0.84 0.70
3 or 4 HS Dropout 39 0.84 0.99
3 or 4 HS Graduate 128 0.87 1.20
3 or 4 Some College 60 0.94 1.07
3 or 4 College Graduate 20 0.91 1.20
S C llome o ege SH  Dropout 17 1 19. 1 22.
1 HS Graduate 136 1.26 1.03
1 Some College 57 1.29 1.09
1 College Graduate 13 - 1.08
2 HS Dropout 31 1.27 1.09
2 HS Graduate 77 1.27 1.15
2 Some College 51 1.25 1.15
2 College Graduate 12 1.28 1.65
3 or 4 HS Dropout 29 1.31 1.17
3 or 4 HS Graduate 114 1.32 1.38
3 or 4 Some College 56 1.29 1.15
3 or 4 College Graduate 19 1.22 1.27
College Graduate 1 HS Dropout 19 1.37 0.97
1 HS Graduate 32 1.74 1.37
1 Some College 29 1.76 1.46
1 College Graduate 6 1.77 1.35
2 HS Dropout 9 1.37 1.24
2 HS Graduate 53 1.76 1.23
2 Some College 36 1.76 1.30
2 College Graduate 4 1.77 1.38
3 or 4 HS Dropout 12 1.77 1.77
3 or 4 HS Graduate 63 1.77 1.44
3 or 4 Some College 45 1.77 1.22
3 or 4 College Graduate 47 1.77 1.15
Notes: Ratios based on average weekly wages over ages 24-35, discounting all wages to age 30 using a 5% discount rate.  
Average wages for high school dropouts and graduates also use measures from ages 22 and 23.  Data from CNLSY.
